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A STRONG INTUITIONISTIC THEORY OF FUNCTIONALS
FARIDA KACHAPOVA
Abstract. In this paper we construct a Beth model for intuitionistic functionals of
high types and use it to create a relatively strong theory SLP containg intuitionistic
principles for functionals, in particular, the theory of the ”creating subject”, axioms for
lawless functionals and some versions of choice axioms.
We prove that the intuitionistic theory SLP is equiconsistent with a classical typed
set theory TI, where the comprehension axiom for sets of type n is restricted to formulas
with no parameters of types > n. We show that each fragment of SLP with types 6 s
is equiconsistent with the corresponding fragment of TI and that it is stronger than the
previous fragment of SLP . Thus, both SLP and TI are much stronger than the second
order arithmetic. By constructing the intuitionistic theory SLP and interpreting in it the
classical set theory TI, we contribute to the program of justifying classical mathematics
from the intuitionistic point of view.
§1. Introduction. The program of justifying classical mathematics from the
intuitionistic point of view was developed by several authors (see, for example,
[11, 4, 1, 8]). One approach is to construct an axiomatic theory with intuitionistic
principles where a classical set theory is interpretable. Myhill [11] showed the
consistency of a classical analysis with respect to an intuitionistic analysis with
Kripke schema. Bernini [1] constructed such an intuitionistic axiomatic theory
with functionals of high types and interpreted a classical typed set theory in it.
However, his theory turned out to be inconsistent [13]. The consistency of its
modifications [2, 13] was not proven.
In this paper we construct a consistent modification of Bernini’s theory [1]
in the following steps using reverse mathematics approach. First we consider a
basic axiomatic theory L with intuitionistic logic and construct a Beth model
Bs for its fragment Ls with types 6 s. The model Bs is the generalisation to
high-order functionals of the Beth model for choice sequences from [12].
Then we check what intuitionistic principles for high-order functionals hold
in the Beth models Bs(s > 1). Combining those together we create a relatively
strong intuitionistic theory SLP ; it includes axioms for lawless functionals, some
versions of choice axioms and axioms for the ”creating subject”. This is reflected
in the name: S is for strong, L is for lawless and P is for proofs, i.e. the theory
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of the ”creating subject”. The Beth model Bs is used to prove the consistency
of SLP .
Next we consider a sub-theory TI of the classical typed set theory TT and
interpret TI in SLP . TI has a restricted comprehension axiom, but it is still
quite strong; we believe that many parts of classical mathematics can be devel-
oped in TI and therefore justified from the intuitionistic point of view, due to
the interpretation of TI in SLP .
In section 2 we remind the reader the general definition and basic properties
of a Beth model. In section 3 we define the basic theory L. In section 4 we
construct our Beth model for the fragment Ls(s > 1). In section 5 we extend L
to a theory LP by axioms for the ”creating subject” and in section 6 we extend
our Beth model to the fragment of LP with types 6 s. Section 7 is technical and
contains lemmas about the Beth model used in further sections. In sections 8-11
we consider different intuitionistic principles in our Beth model. The principles
that hold in the model are combined to create the theory SLP in section 12. In
the rest of section 12 we interpret TI in SLP .
The original theory of Bernini [1] was intended to be a very strong intuitionistic
theory. So in the last two sections we investigate the proof-theoretical strengths
of our theories and show that SLP is relatively strong, though weaker than the
full typed set theory TT . In section 13 we construct a truth predicate in the
language TI and use it to prove that each fragment of TI with types 6 s is
stronger than the previous fragment. Similarly, in section 14 we formalise the
forcing relation of our Beth model in the language TI and show that SLP is
equiconsistent with TI and that each fragment of SLP with types 6 s is stronger
than the previous fragment. In particular, SLP is stronger than the second-order
arithmetic.
In the rest of the Introduction we explain some notations and terminology.
In this paper we will use the same terminology as in the books by Kolmogorov
and Dragalin [7, 3]; in particular, this relates to the following concepts of a
logical-mathematical language and an axiomatic theory.
A logical-mathematical language of first order (or logical-mathematical lan-
guage, or just language in short) is defined as Ω = 〈Srt, Cnst, Fn, Pr〉, where
Srt is a non-empty set of sorts of objects, and for each sort pi ∈ Srt there is a
countable collection of variables of this sort;
Cnst is the set of all constants of the language;
Fn is the set of all functional symbols of the language;
Pr is the set of all predicate symbols of the language.
In the language Ω we can construct terms, atomic formulas and formulas.
Terms of different sorts are constructed recursively from constants and vari-
ables using functional symbols. The complexity of a term t is the number of
occurrences of functional symbols in t.
For each predicate symbol P (x1, . . . , xk) and terms t1, . . . , tk of corresponding
sorts we construct an atomic formula P (t1, . . . , tk).
Formulas are constructed from atomic formulas and logical constant ⊥ using
logical connectives ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction) and ⊃ (implication), and
quantifiers ∀ and ∃. The negation ¬ϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ ⊃⊥. The logical
connective ≡ (equivalence) is defined as (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ). The complexity of
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a formula ϕ is the number of occurrences of logical symbols (the main three
connectives and quantifiers) in ϕ.
Next we define an axiomatic theory (or just theory in short) as Th = 〈Ω, l, A〉,
where each of the three objects is described as follows.
Ω is a logical-mathematical language.
l is the logic of the theory. We will consider only two well-known logics:
the classical logic CPC (classical predicate calculus) and the intuitionistic logic
HPC (Heyting’s predicate calculus); their detailed description can be found, for
example, in [3].
A is some set of closed formulas of the language Ω called the set of non-logical
axioms of Th. When axioms are stated as non-closed formulas, it means that
they must be closed by universal quantifiers over all parameters.
The notation Th ⊢ ϕ (formula ϕ is derivable in the theory Th) means that ϕ
is derivable in the logic l from a finite subset of the axiom set A. The theory Th
is consistent if it is not true that Th ⊢ ⊥.
In this paper we consider axiomatic theories where variables have indices for
types. We will often omit an index of a variable when its value is clear; usually
it is the same index as in a previous occurrence of the variable.
§2. Definitions.
2.1. Definition of Beth model. A path in a partially ordered set b is defined
as a maximal linearly ordered subset of b. A path through an element x is defined
as a path containing x.
The following algebraic definition of a Beth model is a slight modification of
the definition by van Dalen [12].
Definition 2.1. A Beth model B for a logical-mathematical language Ω is
a quadruple of objects 〈M,6, D, V al〉 described as follows.
〈M,6〉 is a partially ordered set, called the domain of the model; elements of
M are denoted α, β, γ, . . . .
D defines domains for variables of the language: for each sort pi, Dpi is the
domain for objects of the sort pi.
We define an evaluated formula as a formula of the language Ω, in which
all parameters are replaced by objects from suitable domains. Another way to
describe an evaluated formula is given in [12]: we assume that the language Ω is
extended by constants for all elements of Dpi for each sort pi ; then an evaluated
formula is defined as a closed formula of the extended language.
V al is a valuation mapping that assigns T or ⊥ to any couple (α, ϕ), where
α ∈ M and ϕ is an atomic evaluated formula, in such a way that this mono-
tonicity condition holds:
(β 6 α&V al(α, ϕ) = T )⇒ V al(β, ϕ) = T.
Elements of M are interpreted as moments or worlds, the relation < on M is
interpreted as ”later in time”.
A topological definition of a Beth model can be found in [3].
Definition 2.2. In the Beth model a forcing relation α  ϕ is defined for
any α∈M and evaluated formula ϕ by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
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For an atomic formula ϕ, α  ϕ iff for any path S in M through α, there is
β ∈ S such that V al(β, ϕ) = T ;
α 6⊥ (falsity is never forced);
α  ψ ∧ η iff (α ψ & α η);
α  ψ ∨ η iff for any path S through α, there is β ∈ S such that β  ψ or
β  η;
α  ψ ⊃ η iff for any β 6 α, (β  ψ ⇒ β  η);
α  ∀xψ(x) iff for any element c of the appropriate domain, α  ψ(c);
α  ∃xψ(x) iff for any path S through α, there is β ∈ S and an element c of
the appropriate domain, such that β  ψ(c).
We will assume that 〈M,6〉 is a tree, which is the usual case.
For the Beth model B, B  ϕ (an evaluated formula ϕ holds in B, or forced in
B) iff ε  ϕ, where ε is the root of the tree M .
2.2. Facts about Beth models. The following lemma and other facts about
Beth models are explained in more detail in [12].
Lemma 2.1. A Beth model B for a logical-mathematical language Ω has the
following properties.
1. Monotonicity: (α  ϕ ∧ β 6 α)⇒ β  ϕ.
2. α  ϕ⇔ for any path S in M through α there is β ∈ S with β  ϕ.
3. Soundness Theorem. For any closed formula ϕ of the language Ω,
(HPC ⊢ ϕ)⇒ (B  ϕ).
We use classical logic in metamathematics and in this lemma, in particular.
Van Dalen [12] constructed a Beth model for the language of intuitionistic
analysis FIM , which has two types of variables: over natural numbers and over
choice sequences. We generalize this model to a Beth model for a language with
many types of functionals.
§3. Axiomatic theories L and Ls. The language of theory L has the fol-
lowing variables:
x, y, z, . . . over natural numbers (variables of type 0),
and variables of type n (n > 1) :
Fn, Gn, Hn, . . . over n-functionals (functionals of type n);
An, Bn, Cn, . . . over lawlike n-functionals;
Fn,Gn,Hn, . . . over lawless n-functionals.
Constants: 0 of type 0 and for each n > 1 a constant Kn (an analog of 0 for
type n).
Functional symbols: Nn, Apn(n > 1), S for successor, · and +.
Predicate symbols: =n for each n > 0.
Terms and n-functionals are defined recursively as follows.
1. Every numerical variable is a term.
2. Constant 0 is a term.
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3. Every variable of type n is an n-functional.
4. Constant Kn is an n-functional.
5. If t is a term, then St is a term.
6. If t1 and t2 are terms, then t1 + t2 and t1 · t2 are terms.
7. If Z is an n-functional, then Nn(Z) is an n-functional (a successor of Z).
8. If Z is a 1-functional, t is a term, then Ap1(Z, t) is a term.
9. If Z is an (n+1)-functional, t is a term, then Apn+1(Z, t) is an n-functional.
Apn(Z, t) is interpreted as the result of application of functional Z to term t.
We also denote Apn(Z, t) as Z(t).
Here 1-functional is interpreted as a function from natural numbers to natural
numbers, and (n+1)-functional is interpreted as a function from natural numbers
to n-functionals.
As usual, lawlike (or constructive) functionals are interpreted as determined
by laws or algorithms. Lawless functionals are opposite extreme: they could not
be determined by any law. At each moment only an initial segment of a lawless
functional is known, and there are no restrictions on its future values.
Atomic formulas:
t =0 τ , where t and τ are terms,
Z =n V , where Z and V are n-functionals (n > 1).
Formulas are constructed from atomic formulas using logical connectives and
quantifiers.
For a formula ϕ, its sort sort(ϕ) is the maximal type of parameters in ϕ; it is
0 if ϕ has no parameters.
The theory L has intuitionistic predicate logic HPC with equality axioms and
the following non-logical axioms.
1. Sx 6= 0, Sx = Sy ⊃ x = y.
2. x+ 0 = x, x+ Sy = S(x+ y).
3. x · 0 = 0, x · Sy = x · y + x.
The first four axioms define arithmetic at the bottom level. As usual, we
introduce terms for all primitive recursive functions in the theory L.
4. Induction for natural numbers: ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(Sx)) ⊃ ∀xϕ(x),
where ϕ is any formula of L.
5. Kn+1(x) = Kn, ¬ (Nn (Fn) = Kn).
6. Nn+1
(
Fn+1
)
(x) = Nn (F (x)), Nn (Fn) = Nn (Gn) ⊃ F = G.
The axioms 5 and 6 describe Kn and Nn as analogs of zero and successor
function, respectively, on level n.
7. Principle of primitive recursive completeness of lawlike functions:
∃A1∀x (A(x) = t) ,
where t is any term containing only variables of type 0 and variables over
lawlike 1-functionals.
L is a basic theory with n-functionals, which is a modification of Bernini’s
theory HL [1]. Later we extend it to a richer theory using reverse mathematics
approach.
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Denote Ls the fragment of the theory L with types not greater than s. The
language of L1 has one type of functionals and is essentially the language of the
intuitionistic analysis FIM .
§4. Beth model for language Ls. Any formal proof in the theory L is
finite and therefore it is a proof in some fragment Ls. So instead of constructing
a model for the entire language L with infinitely many types of functionals, we
construct a Beth model Bs for the fragment Ls (s > 1) by generalizing the model
of van Dalen [12].
4.1. Notations. A sequence of elements x0, x1, . . . , xn is denoted
x = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xn〉, and we denote lth(x) = n + 1. Symbol ∗ denotes the
concatenation function:
〈x0, x1, . . . , xn〉 ∗ 〈y0, y1, . . . , yk〉 = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xn, y0, y1, . . . , yk〉.
For a sequence x, 〈x〉n denotes its nth element and x(n) denotes the initial
segment of x of length n for any n < lth(x). So if x = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xm〉 and
n 6 m, then x¯(n) = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xn−1〉.
For a function f on natural numbers, f(n) denotes the initial segment of f of
length n, that is the sequence 〈f(0), f(1), . . . , f(n− 1)〉.
The notation f : a 99K b means that f is a partial function from set a to set b.
For a function f of two variables denote f [x] = λy.f(x, y).
The notation Z ↓ means that the object Z is defined.
Next we introduce a few notations for a fixed set b.
(a) b(n) is the set of all sequences of elements of b that have length n.
(b) b∗ is the set of all finite sequences of elements of b.
(c) On the set b∗ a partial order 6 is defined by the following:
y 6 x iff x is an initial segment of y.
With this order b∗ is a tree growing down; its root is the empty sequence <>.
Suppose 〈d,6〉 is a partially ordered set and f : (d× ω) 99K c.
(a) f is called monotonic on d iff for any x, y ∈ d, (y 6 x⇒ f [x] ⊆ f [y]).
(b) f is called complete on d iff for any path S in d,
⋃{
f [x] | x ∈ S
}
is a total
function on ω.
4.2. Definition of Beth model Bs. The following Beth model Bs is a new,
improved version of the Beth-Kripke model that we introduced in [6].
Definition 4.1. We fix s > 1 and define a Beth model Bs for the language
Ls:
Bs = 〈M,4, D, V al〉,
where each component is described as follows.
1) First we introduce a triple of objects 〈ak, dk,4k〉 by induction on k; here
4k is a partial order on dk.
a0 = ω, the set of all natural numbers.
d0 = {〈x〉 | x ∈ a∗0}; thus, each element of d0 is a sequence of length 1.
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40 is generated by the order 6 on a
∗
0: 〈x〉 40 〈y〉 iff x 6 y, that is the sequence
y is an initial segment of the sequence x.
For 〈x〉 ∈ d0 we denote lh(〈x〉) = lth(x) and call it the length of 〈x〉.
For k > 1,
ak = {f |f : (dk−1 × ω) 99K ak−1, f is monotonic and complete on dk−1};
dk =
∞⋃
m=0
(
a
(m)
0 × a
(m)
1 × . . .× a
(m)
k
)
;
for x, y ∈ dk, x 4k y iff for each i 6 k, 〈x〉i 6 〈y〉i, that is the sequence 〈y〉i
is an initial segment of the sequence 〈x〉i.
If x ∈ a0
(m) × . . .× ak
(m), we denote lh(x) = m and call it the length of x.
3) Domain of the Beth model is M = ds−1 with partial order 4s−1, which we
will denote just 4.
With this order M is a subtree of the direct product of trees a0
∗, . . . , as−1
∗.
M is a non-countable tree growing down. Its root is ε =< <>, . . . , <>︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
>.
Elements of M are denoted α, β, γ, . . . .
4) Domain for natural numbers is a0 = ω.
5) Domain for k-functionals is ak (k = 1, 2, . . . , s).
6) Domain for lawlike k-functionals:
bk = {f ∈ ak|f
[<>] is a total function}.
7) Before defining a domain for lawless functionals we introduce an auxiliary
set ck(k > 1):
ck = { ξ| ξ : (ω × ak−1)→ ak−1 and ∀n(ξ
[n] is a bijection on ak−1)}.
Elements of ck are called k-permutations. For any k-permutation ξ we define
νk(ξ) as the function f ∈ ak such that for any n ∈ ω, x ∈ dk−1:
f(x, n) =
{
ξ[n](〈〈x〉k−1〉n) if n < lh(x),
undefined otherwise ,
Domain for lawless for k-functionals is lk = {νk(ξ)|ξ ∈ ck}, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
8) It remains to define a valuation mapping V al. The definition consists of
steps (a)-(d).
(a) For each constant Q of the language L we define its interpretation Q̂.
i) 0̂ = 0.
ii) The interpretation of constant Kk (k = 1, . . . , s) is given by the following:
K̂1(x, n) = 0 for any n ∈ ω and x ∈ d0;
K̂k+1(x, n) = K̂k for any n ∈ ω and x ∈ dk.
(b) For any α ∈ M and functional symbol h of the language Ls we define its
interpretation ĥ[α]
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i) If θ is · or +, then θ̂[α] = θ.
ii) Next we define a successor function Sk of type k (k = 0, 1, . . . , s):
S0(x) = x+ 1; Sn+1(f) = Sn ◦ f.
Functional symbol S is interpreted by: Ŝ[α] = S0.
Functional symbol Nk is interpreted by: N̂k[α] = Sk.
iii) Functional symbol Apk is interpreted by: Âp
k[α]
(f, n) = f(α¯(k), n) for any
n ∈ ω, f ∈ ak, k = 1, . . . , s.
Thus, a k-functional f depends not on the entire node α but only on its first
k components.
We define an evaluated term as a term of the language Ls, in which all pa-
rameters are replaced by objects from suitable domains. We define an evaluated
k-functional as a k-functional of the language Ls, in which all parameters are
replaced by objects from suitable domains. These definitions are similar to the
definition of an evaluated formula.
(c) Suppose Z is an evaluated term or n-functional. We define its interpreta-
tion Z [α] at node α by induction on the complexity of Z.
i) If Z is an evaluated variable, then Z [α] = Z.
ii) If Z is a constant, then Z [α] = Ẑ.
iii) If Z = h(V1, . . . , Vm), where h is a functional symbol, then
Z [α] = ĥ[α](V
[α]
1 , . . . , V
[α]
m ).
(d) The valuation mapping V al is defined by:
V al(α,Z =k V ) = T iff Z
[α] ↓ &V [α] ↓ &Z [α] = V [α], k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
This completes the definition of the model Bs.
Clearly, bk ⊆ ak and lk ⊆ ak, k = 1, . . . , s. For α ∈ M, lh(α) = lth(〈α〉k) for
any k < s.
The main difference with the Beth model in [5] is in the definition of a k-
functional and Âp
k
: at each node α the k-functional in the previous model de-
pended only on one component 〈α〉k−1, while in the current model it depends on
components 〈α〉0, . . . , 〈α〉k−1. This modification allows some versions of choice
axioms to be forced in the new model, as will be shown further.
According to Definition 2.2, the forcing relation α  ϕ is defined in the Beth
model Bs.
Next lemma states natural properties of the application predicate.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose k = 1, . . . , s, f ∈ak, n ∈ ω and Âp
k[α]
(f, n) ↓. Then
1. Âp
k[α]
(f, n) ∈ ak−1;
2. β 4 α⇒ Âp
k[β]
(f, n) ↓ &Âp
k[β]
(f, n) = Âp
k[α]
(f, n).
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Proof follows from the definition of Âp and monotonicity of the k-functional
f . ⊣
In the next lemma we show the validity of the interpretations of terms and
functionals.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose α ∈ M , and Z, V are evaluated k-functionals (k =
1, . . . , s) or terms of the language Ls (in this case k = 0). Then the follow-
ing holds.
1.
(
Z [α] ↓
)
⇒
(
Z [α] ∈ ak
)
.
2.
(
Z [α] ↓
)
&β 4 α⇒
(
Z [β] ↓
)
&
(
Z [β] = Z [α]
)
.
3. [V al(α,Z =k V ) = T ]&β 4 α⇒ [V al(β, Z =k V ) = T ].
4. For any path S in M there is γ ∈ S such that Z [γ] ↓ .
Proof. Parts 1, 2 and 3 have the same proof as in [5]. Part 4 is proven
by induction on the complexity of Z. We consider only the non-trivial case
Z = Apk+1(V, t). Consider a path S in M . By the inductive assumption there
are α, β ∈ S such that V [α] ↓ and t[β] ↓.
Denote f = V [α], n = t[β] and S′ =
{
δ¯(k + 1) | δ ∈ S
}
. Then S′ is a path in
dk, f ∈ ak+1 and n ∈ ω by part 1. Since the function f is complete, there is
x ∈ S′, for which f [x](n) ↓.
For some δ ∈ S, x = δ¯(k + 1). Denote γ = min {α, β, δ}. Then γ ∈ S.
By part 2, V [γ] = V [α] = f, t[γ] = t[β] = n and γ¯(k + 1) 4k+1 δ¯(k + 1) = x,
since γ 4 δ. So Z [γ] = V [γ](γ¯(k + 1), t[γ]) = f(γ¯(k + 1), n) = f(x, n) = f [x](n),
since f is monotonic. Hence Z [γ] ↓ . ⊣
Lemma 4.2.3 implies that Bs is a Beth model. Clearly Bs is embedded in
Bs+1 and B1 is essentially the van Dalen’s model [12]. Our interpretation of
a k-functional is similar to the interpretation of a choice sequence in [12]; the
difference is in the recursive use of the tree dk−1 instead of the tree ω
∗.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose α ∈M, f ∈ lk, n ∈ ω. Then
(f(n)[α] ↓)⇔ (n < lh(α)).
Proof. It follows from the interpretation of a lawless functional. ⊣
The following are some examples of k-functionals in the model Bs, k = 1, . . . , s.
1. K̂k is a lawlike k-functional; it is defined at the root of M and it is the
same at every node; K̂k ∈ bk.
10 FARIDA KACHAPOVA
2. For x ∈ dk−1, n ∈ ω, define:
f(x, n) =
{
〈〈x〉k−1〉n if n < lh(x),
undefined otherwise.
Clearly f = νk(ξ), where ξ is an element of ck given by: ξ(n, y) = y. So
f ∈ lk; f is a lawless k-functional whose values are determined by the path.
3. For x ∈ dk−1, n ∈ ω, define:
g(x, n) =
{
undefined if lh(x) = 0,
〈〈x〉k−1〉0 if lh(x) > 0.
The k-functional g is neither lawlike, nor lawless.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness for Ls).
(Ls ⊢ ϕ)⇒ (Bs  ϕ¯),
where ϕ¯ is the closure of the formula ϕ, that is the formula ϕ with universal
quantifiers over all its parameters.
Proof was given in [5]. ⊣
§5. Axiomatic theories LP and LPs. Since L contains arithmetic, in the
language of L we can define Go¨del numbering of symbols and expressions. For
an expression q we will denote xqy the Go¨del number of q in this numbering.
Detailed explanations of Go¨del numbering can be found, for example, in [10].
The language of theory LP is the language of L with an extra predicate symbol
PxX¯.ϕy(z, X¯) for every formula ϕ of L, which has all its parameters in the list
X¯ ; here X¯ denotes a list of variables X1, . . . , Xn. According to tradition, we
denote this symbol as ⊢z ϕ(X¯). It is interpreted that the formula ϕ(X¯) has been
proven by the ”creating subject” at time z.
Axioms of the theory LP are all axioms of L, where the axiom schemata are
taken for the formulas of the new language, and the following axioms (CS1)-
(CS3) for the ”creating subject”; in all three of them ϕ is an arbitrary formula
of L.
Axioms for the ”creating subject”.
(CS1) (⊢z ϕ) ∨ ¬(⊢z ϕ).
(CS2) (⊢z ϕ) ⊃ (⊢z+y ϕ).
(CS3) ∃z(⊢z ϕ) ≡ ϕ.
The language of LPs is the language of Ls with extra predicate symbols
PxX¯.ϕy(z, X¯), where both ϕ and X¯ belong to the language of Ls. Axioms of
the theory LPs are all axioms of LP , which are formulas of the language LPs.
If (A) is a formula of LP , we denote (As) the version of (A) with types not
greater than s.
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§6. Extending the model Bs to the language LPs. We extend the val-
uation mapping V al to each atomic formula ⊢t ϕ, where t is an evaluated term
and ϕ is an evaluated formula of Ls.
V al(α,⊢t ϕ) = T iff t
[α] ↓ &∃γ
[
(α 4 γ)&(lh(γ) = t[α])&(γ  ϕ)
]
.
Lemma 6.1.
[V al(α,⊢t ϕ) = T ]&(β 4 α)⇒ [V al(β,⊢t ϕ) = T ] .
Proof. Suppose V al(α,⊢t ϕ) = T and β 4 α. Then there exists γ such
that α 4 γ, lh(γ) = t[α] and γ  ϕ. Since β 4 α 4 γ, by Lemma 4.2.2,
lh(γ) = t[α] = t[β] and V al(β,⊢t ϕ) = T . ⊣
The Lemma 6.1 implies that Bs is a Beth model for the language LPs.
Lemma 6.2. Suppose α ∈ M , Z is an evaluated term or functional, and ϕ is
an evaluated formula of the language LPs. Then(
Z [α] ↓
)
⇒
[
α  ϕ(Z)⇔ α  ϕ(Z [α])
]
.
Proof. It follows from statement 4.5.1 on pg. 85 of [3]. ⊣
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness for LPs).
LPs ⊢ ϕ⇒ Bs  ϕ¯.
Proof. Proof is by induction on the length of derivation of ϕ.
For axioms and derivation rules of the intuitionistic logic HPC it follows from
the Soundness Theorem for Beth models (Lemma 2.1.3). The axioms for equality
hold in the model due to the definition of V al.
For the induction axiom (axiom 4) it easily follows from the definition of
forcing. For axioms 1-3, 5-7 it follows from Theorem 4.1.
It only remains to check the three axioms for the ”creating subject”.
Proof for (CS1s)
Consider an arbitrary path S inM . There is an element α ∈ S with lh(α) = z.
If α  ϕ, then α  (⊢z ϕ).
Suppose α 1 ϕ. Since lh(α) = z, we have for any β 4 α, β 1 (⊢z ϕ). So
α  ¬ (⊢z ϕ).
This proves Bs  (⊢z ϕ) ∨ ¬ (⊢z ϕ).
Proof for (CS2s)
Suppose α  (⊢z ϕ). Consider an arbitrary path S in M through α and the
element γ ∈ S with lh(γ) = z. Then γ  ϕ.
Choose β ∈ S with lh(β) = z+ y. Then β 4 γ and by monotonicity of forcing
β  ϕ. This implies α  (⊢z+y ϕ).
Proof for (CS3s)
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⇒ Suppose α  ∃z (⊢z ϕ). Consider an arbitrary path S in M through α.
There are z ∈ ω and β ∈ S such that β  (⊢z ϕ). Then for some δ ∈ S we have
V al(δ,⊢z ϕ) = T . So there is γ with γ  ϕ and δ  γ, hence γ ∈ S.
Thus, for any path S through α there is γ ∈ S with γ  ϕ. By Lemma 2.1.2,
α  ϕ.
⇐ Suppose α  ϕ. For any path S through α we have: α ∈ S and α  (⊢z ϕ)
for z = lh(α). Therefore α  ∃z (⊢z ϕ). ⊣
Next we consider some intuitionistic principles in the language LP and check
whether they hold in the model Bs.
§7. Permutations in the model Bs. This technical section contains some
facts about the model Bs necessary for the rest of the paper. We defined a
k-permutation as an element of the set ck, see Definition 4.1.
In this section we fix permutations ξ0 ∈ c1, . . . , ξs−1 ∈ cs. They generate a
few mappings introduced in the following definition.
Definition 7.1. Suppose k = 0, . . . , s− 1.
1. Define ηk by the following:
ηk(x, n) =
(
ξ
[n]
k
)−1
(x).
2. Define
˜˜
ξk by the following:
˜˜ξk(< x0, . . . , xm >) =< ξ
[0]
k (x0), . . . , ξ
[m]
k (xm) > .
3. Define ξ˜k by the following:
ξ˜k(< y0, . . . , yk >) =<
˜˜
ξ0(y0), . . . ,
˜˜
ξk(yk) > .
4.
ξ˜ = ξ˜s−1.
5. Define Λk by induction on k (k = 0, 1, . . . , s).
Λ0(n) = n.
Assume k > 1 and Λk−1 is defined. Define Λk(f) = g, where
g(x, n) = Λk−1
(
f
(
ξ˜k−1(x), n
))
.
This completes the Definition 7.1.
Clearly,
˜˜
ξk is a bijection on a
∗
k and
˜˜ηk is its inverse. Also ξ˜k is a bijection on
dk and η˜k is its inverse. For a lawlike k-functional f , Λk(f) = f because f(x, n)
does not depend on x.
The following technical lemma gives reasons for introducing the aforemen-
tioned mappings.
Lemma 7.1. Suppose k = 0, . . . , s− 1.
1. ηk ∈ ck+1.
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2. ξ˜k is an isomorphism of the partially ordered set dk, i.e. a bijection pre-
serving the order:
y 4k x⇔ ξ˜k(y) 4k ξ˜k(x).
3. ξ˜ is an isomorphism of the partially ordered set M , so
β 4 α⇔ ξ˜(β) 4 ξ˜(α).
4. Suppose S is a path in dk through x and S
′ =
{
ξ˜k(y) | y ∈ S
}
. Then S′ is
a path in dk through ξ˜k(x).
5. Suppose S is a path in M through α and S′ =
{
ξ˜(β) | β ∈ S
}
. Then S′ is
a path in M through ξ˜(α).
6. For k = 0, 1, . . . , s,
f ∈ ak ⇔ Λk(f) ∈ ak.
Proof. 1. Follows from the definition.
2. Clearly
˜˜
ξk is an isomorphism of the partially ordered set a
∗
k, i.e. a bijection
preserving the order:
y 6 x⇔ ˜˜ξk(y) 6
˜˜ξk(x).
The rest follows from the definition of ξ˜k.
3. Follows from part 2 for k = s− 1.
4. Follows from part 2.
5. Follows from part 4 for k = s− 1.
6. ⇒ The proof is by induction on k. The basis step k = 0 is obvious. We
assume that the statement holds for k and prove it for k + 1.
Suppose f ∈ ak+1 and g = Λk+1(f). To show that g ∈ ak+1 we check three
conditions.
(i) We need to prove that g : (dk × ω) 99K ak.
Suppose x ∈ dk, n ∈ ω and y = g(x, n) is defined. Then ξ˜k(x) ∈ dk and
y = Λk
(
f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
))
is defined. So f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
)
∈ ak and by the inductive
assumption y = Λk
(
f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
))
∈ ak.
(ii) Monotonicity.
Suppose y 4k x and g(x, n) ↓ . Then f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
)
↓ and ξ˜k(y) 4k ξ˜k(x) by
part 2. By monotonicity of f , f
(
ξ˜k(y), n
)
↓ and f
(
ξ˜k(y), n
)
= f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
)
, so
g(y, n) ↓ and g(y, n) = g(x, n).
(iii) Completeness.
Consider n ∈ ω and a path S in dk. Denote S′ =
{
ξ˜k(z) | z ∈ S
}
. By part
4, S′ is a path in dk. Then there is y ∈ S′ such that f(y, n) ↓. For some
z ∈ S, y = ξ˜k(z). So f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
)
is defined and belongs to ak. By the inductive
assumption g(x, n) = Λk
(
f
(
ξ˜k(x), n
))
∈ ak and g(x, n) is defined.
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⇐ This follows from the previous if we use η0, . . . , ηs−1 instead of ξ0, . . . , ξs−1.
⊣
The following lemma describes a relation between permutations and forcing.
Lemma 7.2. Suppose:
X¯ is a list of variables X1, . . . , Xr of types k1, . . . , kr, respectively;
f¯ is a list f1, . . . , fr of objects from corresponding domains;
g¯ is the list g1, . . . , gr, where gi = Λki (fi);
β = ξ˜(α).
1. Suppose Z(X¯) is an n-functional (n = 1, . . . , s) or a term (then n = 0),
and all its parameters are in the list X¯. Then
i)
(
Z(f¯)[β] ↓
)
⇒
(
Z(g¯)[α] ↓
)
&
[
Z(g¯)[α] = Λn
(
Z(f¯)[β]
)]
.
ii)
(
Z(f¯)[β] ↓
)
⇔
(
Z(g¯)[α] ↓
)
.
2. Suppose ϕ(X¯) is a formula of Ls and all its parameters are in the list X¯.
Then
β  ϕ(f¯) ⇔ α  ϕ(g¯).
3. Suppose ϕ(X¯) is a formula of LPs and all its parameters are in the list X¯.
Then
β  ϕ(f¯) ⇔ α  ϕ(g¯).
Proof. 1. i) It is proven by induction on the complexity of Z. We consider
the case Z = Apn+1(V, t). Other cases are straightforward. Suppose Z(f¯)[β] ↓.
Then
V (f¯)[β] ↓ &t(f¯)[β] ↓ &V (f¯)[β]
(
β¯(n), t(f¯)[β]
)
↓ .
By the inductive assumption
V (g¯)[α] ↓ &t(g¯)[α] ↓ &V (g¯)[α] = Λn+1
(
V (f¯)[β]
)
&t(g¯)[α] = t(f¯)[β].
Z(g¯)[α] = V (g¯)[α]
(
α¯(n), t(g¯)[α]
)
= Λn+1
(
V
(
f¯
)[β])(
α¯(n), t(f¯)[β]
)
= Λn
[
V (f¯)[β]
(
ξ˜n (α¯(n)) , t(f¯)
[β]
)]
= Λn
[
V (f¯)[β]
(
β¯(n), t(f¯)[β]
)]
= Λn
(
Z(f¯)[β]
)
.
So Z(g¯)[α] ↓ .
ii) The implication from left to right follows from part i). The implication
from right to left is proven using η0, . . . , ηs−1 instead of ξ0, . . . , ξs−1.
2. The proof involves the same steps as in [5].
3. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ using Definition 2.2 of
forcing. Let us consider the case when ϕ is an atomic formula ⊢t(X¯) ψ(X¯). All
other cases are proven the same way as in [5].
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⇒ Suppose β  ϕ(f¯). Consider an arbitrary path S in M through α. Denote
S′ =
{
ξ˜(γ) | γ ∈ S
}
. By Lemma 7.1.5, S′ is a path in M through β. So there
is δ′ ∈ S′ such that V al
(
δ′,⊢t(f¯) ψ(f¯)
)
= T . There exists γ′ such that δ′ 4 γ′,
lh(γ′) = t(f¯)[δ
′] and γ′  ψ(f¯). Clearly, γ′ ∈ S′ and for some γ ∈ S, γ′ = ξ˜(γ).
By part 2, γ  ψ(g¯).
For some δ ∈ S, δ′ = ξ˜(δ) and δ 4 γ. By the definition of ξ˜ and part 1,
lh(γ) = lh(γ′) = t(f¯)[δ
′] = t(g¯)[δ], so V al
(
δ,⊢t(g¯) ψ(g¯)
)
= T . Hence α  ϕ(g¯).
⇐ follows from the previous if we take η0, . . . , ηs−1 instead of ξ0, . . . , ξs−1. ⊣
The following lemma states some properties of forcing in the model Bs.
Lemma 7.3. Suppose:
X¯ is a list of variables X1, X2, . . . , Xr;
f¯ is a list f1, f2, . . . , fr of objects from corresponding domains.
1. Suppose ϕ(X¯) is a formula of LPs with all its parameters in the list X¯ and
sort(ϕ) 6 m, where m > 1. Suppose
m−1∧
i=0
(〈α〉i = 〈β〉i) .
Then (
α  ϕ(f¯ )
)
⇔
(
β  ϕ(f¯)
)
.
2. Suppose ϕ(Hp, X¯) is a formula of LPs with all its parameters in the list
Hp, X¯; sort(ϕ) 6 p and ϕ does not have non-lawlike parameters of type p
other than Hp. Suppose g, h ∈ lp and
(∀n < lh(α))
(
g(n)[α] = h(n)[α]
)
.
Then (
α  ϕ(g, f¯)
)
⇔
(
α  ϕ(h, f¯)
)
.
Proof. Denote ki the type of variable Xi, i = 1 . . . , r.
1. Denote l = lh(α). Since 〈α〉0 = 〈β〉0, we have lh(β) = lh(α) = l. For any
k = 0, . . . , s− 1 define ξk by the following: for n ∈ ω, x ∈ ak,
ξk(n, x) =

〈〈β〉k〉n if (n < l&x = 〈〈α〉k〉n) ,
〈〈α〉k〉n if (n < l&x = 〈〈β〉k〉n) ,
x otherwise .
Then each ξk ∈ ck+1 and β = ξ˜(α). Denote gi = Λki (fi) for i = 1, . . . , r. By
Lemma 7.2.3,
β  ϕ(f¯)⇔ α  ϕ(g¯).(1)
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If k < m, then 〈α〉k = 〈β〉k and
(∀n ∈ ω)(∀x ∈ ak)
(
ξ
[n]
k (x) = x
)
,
(∀y ∈ dk)
(
ξ˜k(y) = y
)
,
so for any j 6 m,
(∀z ∈ aj) (Λj(z) = z) .
Since sort(ϕ) 6 m, for each i = 1, . . . , r, we have ki 6 m and gi = Λki(fi) = fi.
So by (1)
β  ϕ(f¯ )⇔ α  ϕ(f¯).
2. For some χ1, χ2 ∈ cp, g = νp(χ1) and h = νp(χ2). Clearly p > 1. Define
permutations ξ0, . . . , ξs−1:
ξ
[n]
p−1 =
(
χ
[n]
2
)−1
◦ χ
[n]
1 ; ξ
[n]
k (x) = x for k 6= p− 1.
By Lemma 7.2.3, it is sufficient to prove the following:
ξ˜(α) = α;(2)
Λki (fi) = fi, i = 1, . . . , r;(3)
Λp(h) = g.(4)
Proof of (2).
Denote α = 〈α0, . . . , αs−1〉. Then ξ˜(α) = 〈
˜˜ξ0(α0), . . . ,
˜˜ξs−1(αs−1)〉. Clearly
˜˜
ξk(αk) = αk for k 6= p− 1.
Now consider k = p− 1. Fix n < lh(α). Since g = νp(χ1) and h = νp(χ2),
χ
[n]
1 (〈αp−1〉n) = g(α¯(p), n) = g(n)
[α] = h(n)[α] = h(α¯(p), n) = χ
[n]
2 (〈αp−1〉n) .
Thus, χ
[n]
1 (〈αp−1〉n) = χ
[n]
2 (〈αp−1〉n) and
ξ
[n]
p−1 (〈αp−1〉n) =
(
χ
[n]
2
)−1 (
χ
[n]
1 (〈αp−1〉n)
)
= 〈αp−1〉n.
So for any n < lh(α), ξ
[n]
p−1 (〈αp−1〉n) = 〈αp−1〉n and
˜˜
ξp−1(αp−1) = αp−1.
Proof of (3).
For k < p− 1, ξ˜k(x) = x for any x ∈ dk and
(∀y ∈ aj) (Λj(y) = y) , j < p.(5)
If fi is a domain object for a lawlike ki-functional, then Λki(fi) = fi; otherwise
ki < p and Λki(fi) = fi by (5).
Proof of (4).
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For any n ∈ ω, x ∈ dp−1,
Λp(h)(x, n) = Λp−1
(
h
(
ξ˜p−1(x), n
))
= h
(
ξ˜p−1(x), n
)
by (5).
Since ξ˜p−1(x) has the same length as x, it is sufficient to prove:
h
(
ξ˜p−1(x), n
)
= g(x, n) for any n < lh(x).
Since g = νp(χ1) and h = νp(χ2), we have:
h
(
ξ˜p−1(x), n
)
= χ
[n]
2
(
〈〈ξ˜p−1(x)〉p−1〉n
)
= χ
[n]
2
(
ξ
[n]
p−1 (〈〈x〉p−1〉n)
)
= χ
[n]
2
[(
χ
[n]
2
)−1
◦ χ
[n]
1 (〈〈x〉p−1〉n)
]
= χ
[n]
1 (〈〈x〉p−1〉n) = g(x, n).
⊣
§8. Axioms for lawless functionals. We can introduce finite sequences in
LP and for any k-functional F use the notation F¯ (n) =< F (0), . . . , F (n− 1) >.
The following are modifications for the language LP of the axioms for lawless
sequences in [12] and the axioms for lawless functionals in [1].
(LL1) The axiom of existence of lawless functionals:
∃Fn(∀y 6 x)(F(y) = Fn(y)).
(LL2) Fn = Gn ∨ Fn 6= Gn.
(LL3) The principle of open data:
ϕ(Hn) ⊃ ∃x∀Gn[G¯(x) = H¯(x) ⊃ ϕ(G)],
where ϕ is a formula of LP , sort(ϕ) 6 n and ϕ does not have non-lawlike
parameters of type n other than Hn.
Denote (LL) a conjunction of the closures of (LL1), (LL2) and (LL3).
Theorem 8.1. Bs  (LLs).
Proof. (LL1s). Fix f ∈ an and a path S in M . By induction on x we will
prove:
(∃α ∈ S)(∀y 6 x)f(y)[α] ↓ .
For x = 0 it follows from Lemma 4.2.4.
Assume it holds for x: for some β ∈ S, (∀y 6 x)f(y)[β] ↓. By Lemma
4.2.4, there is γ ∈ S such that f(x + 1)[γ] ↓. For α = min {β, γ} we have
(∀y 6 x+ 1)f(y)[α] ↓.
Now let us prove that (LL1s) holds in the model. Fix an arbitrary x ∈ ω and
α ∈ S such that (∀y 6 x)f(y)[α] ↓ .
The path S = {〈g¯0(k), . . . , g¯s−1(k)〉 | k ∈ ω} for some functions
g0 : ω → a0, . . . , gs−1 : ω → as−1. Denote β = 〈g¯0(x+ 1), . . . , g¯s−1(x + 1)〉
and γ = min {α, β}. Then β, γ ∈ S and (∀y 6 x)f(y)[γ] ↓.
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Define ξ by:
ξ(y, z) =

f(y)[γ] if y 6 x&z = gn−1(y),
gn−1(y) if y 6 x&z = f(y)
[γ],
z otherwise .
For any y 6 x, gn−1(y) ∈ an−1 and f(y)[γ] ∈ an−1. So ξ : (ω × an−1)→ an−1
and for any y ∈ ω, ξ[y] is a bijection on an−1. Therefore ξ ∈ cn. Take h =
νn(ξ) ∈ ln. It remains to prove:
γ  (∀y 6 x) [h(y) = f(y)] .
For any y 6 x, h(y)[γ] = h (γ¯(n), y) = ξ[y] (〈〈γ〉n−1〉y). Since γ 4 β, we have
〈γ〉n−1 6 〈β〉n−1 and 〈〈γ〉n−1〉y = gn−1(y). So h(y)[γ] = ξ[y](gn−1(y)) = f(y)[γ]
by the definition of ξ.
For (LL2s) the proof follows from the interpretation of equality.
(LL3s). Suppose X¯ is a list of variables X1, . . . , Xr and f¯ is a list f1, . . . , fr
of objects from corresponding domains. Suppose all parameters of ϕ are in the
list Hn, X¯ . Suppose h ∈ ln and
α  ϕ(h, f¯).(6)
Take x = lh(α). It is sufficient to prove that for any g ∈ ln,
α  (∀y < x) (g(y) = h(y)) ⊃ ϕ(g, f¯).
Suppose β 4 α and (∀y < x)β  (g(y) = h(y)). Since x = lh(α), we have
(∀y < x)
[
g(y)[α] ↓ &h(y)[α] ↓
]
by Lemma 4.3. So (∀y < x)
(
g(y)[α] = h(y)[α]
)
.
By (6) and Lemma 7.3.2, α  ϕ(g, f¯). ⊣
§9. Choice axioms in the model Bs. For an m-functional F of language
LP and n 6 m denote F (0) . . . (0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
as F (0)n for brevity.
We consider the following two axioms of choice and show that they hold in
the model Bs.
(C1) The axiom of choice for numbers:
∀x∃yϕ(x, y) ⊃ ∃Fm∀xϕ(x, F (x)(0)m−1),
where ϕ is a formula of LP and m > max(sort(ϕ), 1).
(C2) The axiom of choice with uniqueness:
∀x∃!Gnϕ(x,G) ⊃ ∃Fm∀xϕ(x, F (x)(0)m−n−1),
where ϕ is a formula of LP and m > max(sort(ϕ), n + 1).
Denote (C) a conjunction of the closures of (C1) and (C2).
Theorem 9.1. Bs  (Cs).
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Proof. In case s = 1 the proof is the same as in [12], since the model described
there is essentially B1. We will assume s > 2.
For a ∈ a
(k)
0 × . . .× a
(k)
m−1, denote:
extension(a) = a∗ << K̂m, . . . , K̂m︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
>, . . . , < K̂s−1, . . . , K̂s−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
>> .
The operation of extension extends a node a ∈ dm−1 by constant functionals
to a node in the domain M ; it preserves the length of the node.
By Lemma 7.3.1, for any formula χ with sort(χ) 6 m and its evaluation χ˜:
α¯(m) = β¯(m)⇒ (α  χ˜⇔ β  χ˜) .(7)
PROOF for (C1s)
Denote ψ(x, y) the formula ϕ(x, y), in which all parameters, except x and y,
are replaced by objects from corresponding domains.
Denote
shortest (α, β, x)⇌ α 4 β&∃y [β  ψ(x, y)] &(∀γ ≻ β)¬∃z [γ  ψ(x, z)] .
We have:
∃y [α  ψ(x, y)]⇒ ∃!βshortest (α, β, x).(8)
Indeed, of the finite number of nodes β < α with ∃y [β  ψ(x, y)] we take the
unique β with smallest length.
Fix α ∈M . Suppose
α  ∀x∃yψ(x, y).
Denote α′ = extension(α¯(m)). So by (7),
α′  ∀x∃yψ(x, y)(9)
CASE m = 2. First we construct the proof for this case because it clearly
demonstrates the main construction. Other cases will be considered later.
Thus, sort(ϕ) 6 2.
By (7), it is sufficient to prove:
α′  ∃F 2∀xψ(x, F (x)(0)).(10)
First we construct a function f ∈ a2 that can be used in (10).
For fixed β and x ∈ ω define function qβ,x:
qβ,x(v, k) =

0 if lh(v) > lh(β)&¬(v 40 β¯(1)),
the smallest number y, for which β  ψ(x, y)
if v 40 β¯(1)&∃z [β  ψ(x, z)] ,
undefined otherwise.
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Next we construct a function that can be used in (10).
f(u, x) =

K̂1 if lh(u) > lh(α)&¬(u 41 α¯(2)),
qβ,x for the unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
if u 41 α¯(2)&∃y [extension(u)  ψ(x, y)] ,
undefined otherwise.
Proof that f ∈ a2.
1) First we prove that f : (d1 × ω) 99K a1. Suppose f(u, x) ↓. We need to
prove that f(u, x) ∈ a1.
When f(u, x) = K̂1, it is obvious. Assume f(u, x) = qβ,x. Then u 41 α¯(2),
shortest(extension(u), β, x) and
∃z [β  ψ(x, z)] .(11)
The proof that qβ,x ∈ a1 consists of three parts.
a) Clearly, qβ,x : (d0 × ω) 99K a0.
b) Monotonicity of qβ,x.
Suppose qβ,x(v, k) ↓ and w 40 v. Then lh(v) > lh(β). There are two cases.
i) ¬(v 40 β¯(1)).
If w 40 β¯(1), then β¯(1) = w¯(m) and v = w¯(n) for some m and n, which
implies v 40 β¯(1) due to lh(v) > lh(β). Thus, ¬(w 40 β¯(1)) and qβ,x(w, k) =
0 = qβ,x(v, k).
ii) v 40 β¯(1).
Then w 40 β¯(1). By (11) both qβ,x(w, k) and qβ,x(v, k) equal the smallest
number y, for which β  ψ(x, y).
c) Completeness of qβ,x.
Consider a path S0 in d0 and k ∈ ω. Take v ∈ S0 with length lh(β). There
are two cases.
i) β¯(1) /∈ S0.
Then ¬(v 40 β¯(1)) and qβ,x(v, k) = 0.
ii) β¯(1) ∈ S0.
Then v = β¯(1) and by (11), qβ,x(v, k) equals the smallest number y, for which
β  ψ(x, y).
This completes the proof that qβ,x ∈ a1 and therefore f : (d1 × ω) 99K a1.
2) Monotonicity of f .
Suppose f(u, x) ↓ and v 41 u. Then lh(v) > lh(u) > lh(α). There are two
cases.
i) ¬(u 41 α¯(2)).
In this case ¬(v 41 α¯(2)), so f(v, x) = K̂1 = f(u, x).
ii) u 41 α¯(2).
Then v 41 α¯(2), there is a unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x) and
f(u, x) = qβ,x.
For some y we have: extension(u)  ψ(x, y).
Since extension(v) 4 extension(u), we have: shortest(extension(v), β, x) and
by monotonicity of forcing, extension(v)  ψ(x, y). So f(v, x) = qβ,x for the
same β.
3) Completeness of f .
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Consider x ∈ ω and a path S1 in d1. There are two cases.
i) α¯(2) /∈ S1.
Take u ∈ S1 with length lh(α). Then ¬(u 41 α¯(2)) and f(u, x) = K̂1.
ii) α¯(2) ∈ S1.
Denote S′1 = {extension(v) | v ∈ S1}. Then S
′
1 is a path inM through α
′ and
by (9), for some δ ∈ S′1, ∃y [δ  ψ(x, y)].
Take γ = min{α′, δ} and u = γ¯(2). Then u 41 α¯(2), γ = extension(u),
u ∈ S1 and ∃y [γ  ψ(x, y)]. By (8), there is a unique β with shortest(γ, β, x).
Therefore f(u, x) = qβ,x. This completes the proof of f ∈ a2.
Proof of (10).
It is sufficient to prove:
∀x [α′  ψ(x, f(x)(0))] .
Fix x ∈ ω. By Lemma 2.1.2, it is sufficient to prove:
(∀ path S2 through α
′)(∃γ ∈ S2) [γ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)] .
Consider a path S2 inM through α
′. Denote S′2 = {extension(σ¯(2)) | σ ∈ S2}.
Then S′2 is also a path in M through α
′.
By (9), for some δ′ ∈ S′2, ∃y [δ
′  ψ(x, y)]. Denote δ = min{α′, δ′} and
u = δ¯(2). Then δ ∈ S′2, u 41 α¯(2), δ = extension(u) and ∃y [δ  ψ(x, y)].
By (8), for some β we have: shortest(δ, β, x), δ 4 β and f(x)[δ] = f(u, x) =
qβ,x.
Therefore f(x)(0)[δ] = f(x)[δ](δ¯(1), 0) = qβ,x(δ¯(1), 0) = the smallest y, for
which β  ψ(x, y). Then f(x)(0)[δ] = y and β  ψ(x, y).
So δ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)[δ]) and by Lemma 6.2, δ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)). Since δ ∈ S′2,
there is γ ∈ S2 with γ¯(2) = δ¯(2) and by (7), γ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)). This completes
the proof for case m = 2.
CASE m = 1 is similar with f ∈ a1 defined by:
f(u, x) =

0 if lh(u) > lh(α)&¬(u 40 α¯(1)),
the smallest number y, for which β  ψ(x, y)
for the unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
if u 40 α¯(1)&∃z [extension(u)  ψ(x, z)] ,
undefined otherwise.
CASE m > 3.
We use the following functions defined for fixed β and x ∈ ω.
q0,β,x = qβ,x as defined in case m = 2;
q1,β,x(u, k) =

K̂1 if lh(u) > lh(β)&¬(u 41 β¯(2)),
q0,β,x if u 41 β¯(2),
undefined otherwise;
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q2,β,x(u, k) =

K̂2 if lh(u) > lh(β)&¬(u 42 β¯(3)),
q1,β,x if u 42 β¯(3),
undefined otherwise;
. . .
qm−2,β,x(u, k) =

K̂m−2 if lh(u) > lh(β)&¬(u 4m−2 β¯(m− 1)),
qm−3,β,x if u 4m−2 β¯(m− 1),
undefined otherwise.
Finally, we define function f :
f(u, x) =

K̂m−1 if lh(u) > lh(α)&¬(u 4m−1 α¯(m)),
qm−2,β,x for the unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
if u 4m−1 α¯(m)&∃y [extension(u)  ψ(x, y)] ,
undefined otherwise.
Then f ∈ am and ∀x[α′  ψ(x, f(x) (0) . . . (0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
)].
PROOF for (C2s)
It involves similar steps as the proof for (C1s) but with new notations.
Denote ψ(x,Gn) the formula ϕ(x,Gn), in which all parameters, except x and
G, are replaced by objects from corresponding domains.
Denote shortest (α, β, x)⇌
α 4 β&(∃g ∈ an) [β  ψ(x, g)] &(∀γ ≻ β)¬(∃h ∈ an) [γ  ψ(x, h)] .
Clearly,
(∃g ∈ an) [α  ψ(x, g)]⇒ ∃!βshortest (α, β, x).(12)
Fix α ∈M . Suppose
α  ∀x∃!Gnψ(x,G).
Denote α′ = extension(α¯(m)). So by (7),
α′  ∀x∃!Gnψ(x,G).(13)
By (13), for any β and x ∈ ω:
(β 4 α′ ∨ α′ 4 β)&(g ∈ an)& [β  ψ(x, g)]⇒ this g is unique.(14)
CASE m = n+2. First we construct the proof for this case because it clearly
demonstrates the main construction. Other cases will be considered later.
Thus, sort(ϕ) 6 n+ 2.
By (7), it is sufficient to prove:
α′  ∃Fm∀xψ(x, F (x)(0)).(15)
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For fixed x ∈ ω and fixed β with (β 4 α′ ∨ α′ 4 β) by (14) there is a unique
function Qβ,x such that:
Qβ,x(v, k) =

K̂n if lh(v) > lh(β)&¬(v 4n β¯(n+ 1)),
the unique g ∈ an with β  ψ(x, g)
if v 4n β¯(n+ 1)&(∃h ∈ an) [β  ψ(x, h)] ,
undefined otherwise.
Next we construct a function f that can be used in (15).
f(u, x) =

K̂n+1 if lh(u) > lh(α)&¬(u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2)),
Qβ,x for the unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
if u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2)&(∃g ∈ an) [extension(u)  ψ(x, g)] ,
undefined otherwise.
Proof that f ∈ an+2.
1) First we prove that f : (dn+1 × ω) 99K an+1. Suppose f(u, x) ↓. We need
to prove that f(u, x) ∈ an+1.
When f(u, x) = K̂n+1, it is obvious.
Assume f(u, x) = Qβ,x. Then u 4n+1 α¯n+2, shortest(extension(u), β, x) and
(∃h ∈ an) [β  ψ(x, h)] .(16)
Since extension(u) 4 α′ and extension(u) 4 β, we have:
β 4 α′ ∨ α′ 4 β.
The proof that Qβ,x ∈ an+1 consists of three parts.
a) Clearly, Qβ,x : (dn × ω) 99K an.
b) Monotonicity of Qβ,x.
Suppose Qβ,x(v, k) ↓ and w 4n v. Then lh(v) > lh(β). There are two cases.
i) ¬(v 4n β¯(n+ 1)).
Then ¬(w 4n β¯(n+ 1)) and Qβ,x(w, k) = K̂n = Qβ,x(v, k).
ii) v 4n β¯(n+ 1).
Then w 4n β¯(n+ 1). By (16) and (14) both Qβ,x(w, k) and Qβ,x(v, k) equal
the unique g ∈ an, for which β  ψ(x, g).
c) Completeness of Qβ,x.
Consider a path S3 in dn and k ∈ ω. Take v ∈ S3 with length lh(β). There
are two cases.
i) β¯(n+ 1) /∈ S3.
Then ¬(v 4n β¯(n+ 1)) and Qβ,x(v, k) = K̂n.
ii) β¯(n+ 1) ∈ S3.
Then v = β¯(n+1) and by (14), (16), Qβ,x(v, k) equals the unique g ∈ an with
β  ψ(x, g).
This completes the proof that Qβ,x ∈ an+1 and f : (dn+1 × ω) 99K an+1.
2) Monotonicity of f .
Suppose f(u, x) ↓ and v 4n+1 u. Then lh(v) > lh(u) > lh(α). There are two
cases.
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i) ¬(u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2)).
In this case ¬(v 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2)), so f(v, x) = K̂n+1 = f(u, x).
ii) u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2).
Then v 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2); there is a unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
and f(u, x) = Qβ,x.
For some g ∈ an we have: extension(u)  ψ(x, g). Since extension(u) 4
extension(v), we have: shortest(extension(v), β, x) and by monotonicity of forc-
ing, extension(v)  ψ(x, g). So f(v, x) = Qβx for the same β.
3) Completeness of f .
Consider x ∈ ω and a path S4 in dn+1. There are two cases.
i) α¯(n+ 2) /∈ S4.
Take u ∈ S4 with length lh(α). Then ¬(u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2)) and f(u, x) = K̂n+1.
ii) α¯(n+ 2) ∈ S4.
Denote S′4 = {extension(v) | v ∈ S4}. Then S
′
4 is a path inM through α
′ and
by (13), for some δ ∈ S′4, (∃g ∈ an) [δ  ψ(x, g)].
Take γ = min{α′, δ} and u = γ¯(n+ 2). Then u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2), γ =
extension(u), u ∈ S4 and (∃g ∈ an) [γ  ψ(x, g)]. By (12), there is a unique
β with shortest(γ, β, x). Therefore f(u, x) = Qβ,x. This completes the proof of
f ∈ an+2.
Proof of (15).
It is sufficient to prove:
∀x [α′  ψ(x, f(x)(0))] .
Fix x ∈ ω. By Lemma 2.1.2, it is sufficient to prove:
(∀ path S5 through α
′)(∃γ ∈ S5) [γ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)] .
Consider a path S5 through α
′. Denote S′5 = {extension(σ¯(n+ 2)) | σ ∈ S5}.
Then S′5 is also a path in M through α
′.
By (13), for some δ′ ∈ S′5, (∃g ∈ an) [δ
′  ψ(x, g)]. Denote δ = min{α′, δ′}
and u = δ¯(n + 2). Then δ ∈ S′5, u 4n+1 α¯(n+ 2), δ = extension(u) and
(∃g ∈ an) [δ  ψ(x, g)].
By (12), for some β we have: shortest(δ, β, x), δ 4 β and f(x)[δ] = f(u, x) =
Qβ,x. Since δ 4 α
′ and δ 4 β, we have:
β 4 α′ ∨ α′ 4 β.
Therefore f(x)(0)[δ] = f(x)[δ](δ¯(n + 1), 0) = Qβ,x(δ¯(n + 1), 0) = the unique
g ∈ an, for which β  ψ(x, g), according to (14). Then f(x)(0)
[δ] = g and
β  ψ(x, g).
So δ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)[δ]) and by Lemma 6.2, δ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)). Since δ ∈ S′5,
there is γ ∈ S5 with γ¯(n + 2) = δ¯(n + 2) and by (7), γ  ψ(x, f(x)(0)). This
completes the proof for case m = n+ 2.
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CASE m = n+ 1 is similar with f ∈ an+1 defined by:
f(u, x) =

K̂n if lh(u) > lh(α)&¬(u 4n α¯(n+ 1)),
the unique g ∈ an, for which β  ψ(x, g)
for the unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
if u 4n α¯(n+ 1)&(∃h ∈ an) [extension(u)  ψ(x, h)] ,
undefined otherwise.
CASE m > n+ 3.
The following functions are defined for fixed x ∈ ω and fixed β ∈ M with
(β 4 α′ ∨ α′ 4 β).
Qn,β,x = Qβ,x as defined in case m = n+ 2.
Qn+1,β,x(u, k) =

K̂n+1 if lh(u) > lh(β)&¬(u 4n+1 β¯(n+ 2)),
Qn,β,x if u 4n+1 β¯(n+ 2),
undefined otherwise;
Qn+2,β,x(u, k) =

K̂n+2 if lh(u) > lh(β)&¬(u 4n+2 β¯(n+ 3)),
Qn+1,β,x if u 4n+2 β¯(n+ 3),
undefined otherwise;
. . .
Qm−2,β,x(u, k) =

K̂m−2 if lh(u) > lh(β)&¬(u 4m−2 β¯(m− 1)),
Qm−3,β,x if u 4m−2 β¯(m− 1),
undefined otherwise.
Finally, we define function f :
f(u, x) =

K̂m−1 if lh(u) > lh(α)&¬(u 4m−1 α¯(m)),
Qm−2,β,x for the unique β with shortest(extension(u), β, x)
if u 4m−1 α¯(m)&(∃g ∈ an) [extension(u)  ψ(x, g)] ,
undefined otherwise.
Then f ∈ am and ∀x[α′  ψ(x, f(x) (0) . . . (0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−n−1
)]. ⊣
§10. Kripke’s schema in the model Bs. In LP we consider the following
Kripke’s schema:
(KS) ∃Gm
[
ϕ ≡ ∃x
(
G(x)(0)m−1 6= 0
)]
,
where ϕ is a formula of L, Gm is not a parameter of ϕ and m > max(sort(ϕ), 1).
Theorem 10.1. 1. LPs + (Cs) ⊢ (KSs).
2. LP + (C) ⊢ (KS).
3. Bs  (KSs).
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Proof. 1. Axiom (CS1s) implies:
∀x∃y [y 6= 0 ≡ (⊢x ϕ)] .
Since sort(⊢x ϕ) = sort(ϕ), then by axiom (C1s) there exists Gm such that:
∀x
[(
G(x)(0)m−1 6= 0
)
≡ (⊢x ϕ)
]
.
Then
∃x
[
G(x)(0)m−1 6= 0
]
≡ ∃x(⊢x ϕ)
and by axiom (CS3s)
∃x
[
G(x)(0)m−1 6= 0
]
≡ ϕ.
2. Follows from part 1.
3. It follows from part 1, Theorem 9.1 and the soundness of the model Bs for
LPs. ⊣
§11. Other intuitionistic principles in the model Bs.
11.1. Weak continuity.
(WC) ∀Fn∃xϕ(F , x) ⊃ ∀Fn∃x∃y∀Gn[G¯(y) = F¯(y) ⊃ ϕ(G, x)],
where ϕ is a formula of LP with sort(ϕ) 6 n and ϕ does not have non-lawlike
parameters of type n other than Fn.
Theorem 11.1. 1. LPs + (LL3s) ⊢ (WCs).
2. LP + (LL3) ⊢ (WC).
3. Bs  (WCs).
Proof. 1. Denote ψ(x, y,Fn,Gn) the formula G¯(y) = F¯(y) ⊃ ϕ(G, x).
By (LL3s),
∀Fn∀x [ϕ(F , x) ⊃ ∃y∀Gnψ(x, y,F ,G)] .
Then
∀Fn [∃xϕ(F , x) ⊃ ∃x∃y∀Gnψ(x, y,F ,G)]
and
∀Fn∃xϕ(F , x) ⊃ ∀Fn∃x∃y∀Gnψ(x, y,F ,G).
2. Follows from part 1.
3. It follows from part 1, Theorem 8.1 and the soundness of the model Bs for
LPs. ⊣
11.2. Bar induction.
(BI) ∀F 1∃xϕ(F¯ (x)) ∧ ∀x∀y[ϕ(y) ⊃ ϕ(y ∗ 〈x〉)]
∧ ∀y[∀xψ(y ∗ 〈x〉) ⊃ ψ(x)] ∧ ∀y[ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] ⊃ ψ(0).
Theorem 11.2. Bs  (BIs).
Proof. The proof is the same as for Van Dalen’s model [12]. ⊣
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11.3. Markov principle. This principle is often considered in constructive
mathematics.
Markov Principle:
(MP) ∀x [ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)] ∧ ¬¬∃xϕ(x) ⊃ ∃xϕ(x).
Markov Rule:
(MR) If ∀x [ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)] and ¬¬∃xϕ(x), then ∃xϕ(x).
Theorem 11.3. 1. The Markov Rule (MR) does not hold in Bs.
2. The Markov Principle (MP) does not hold in Bs.
Proof. 1. Denote ψ(x, F 1)⇌ (∃k < x)(F (k) > 0). For u ∈ d0, n ∈ ω, define:
f(u, n) =
{
〈〈u〉0〉n if n < lh(u),
undefined otherwise.
Then f ∈ a1. Denote ϕ(x)⇌ ψ(x, f). We need to check that the premises of
(MR) are forced in the model:
Bs  ∀x [ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)] ,(17)
Bs  ¬¬∃xϕ(x)(18)
but the conclusion is not forced:
¬ (Bs  ∃xϕ(x)) .(19)
Proof of (17). We need to prove:
(∀x ∈ ω)(∀ path S in M)(∃α ∈ S) [α  ϕ(x) or α  ¬ϕ(x)] .
Fix x ∈ ω and a path S in M . Choose α ∈ S with lh(α) = x. Then for any
n < x, f [α](n) ↓.
If (∃n < x)
(
f [α](n) > 0
)
, then α  ϕ(x). Otherwise (∀n < x)
(
f [α](n) = 0
)
,
which implies α  ¬ϕ(x).
Proof of (18). It is sufficient to prove:
∀α∃x(∃y < x)(∃β 4 α) (β  f(y) > 0) .
Fix α ∈M . Denote n = lh(α) and choose
x = n+ 1, y = n, β =
〈
〈α〉0 ∗ 〈1〉 , 〈α〉1 ∗
〈
K̂1
〉
, . . . , 〈α〉s−1 ∗
〈
K̂s−1
〉〉
.
Then β  α, f [β](y) = 〈〈β〉0〉n = 1 and β  f(y) > 0.
Proof of (19). For any n > 0 we define a function gn : ω → an as follows:
g0 = λm.0 and for n > 1, gn = λm.K̂
n. We take
S = {< g¯0(m), . . . , g¯s−1(m) > |m ∈ ω} .
Then S is a path in M . For any α ∈ S and x = lh(α) we have:
for any y < x, f [α](y) = f(α¯(1), y) = 〈〈α〉0〉y = g0(y) = 0.
This implies (19).
2. Follows from part 1. ⊣
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11.4. Formal Church thesis.
(CT) ∀x∃yϕ(x, y) ⊃ ∃e∀x∃y[{e} (x) = y ∧ ϕ(x, y)].
Theorem 11.4. LP + (C1) + (CT ) is inconsistent.
Proof. Van Dalen [12] showed that HA+(C1)+(CT ) is inconsistent, which
implies the theorem. ⊣
§12. Intuitionistic theory SLP and classical theory TI. By using re-
verse mathematics approach we combine in one axiomatic theory all intuitionistic
principles that were shown to hold in the model Bs:
SLP = LP + (LL) + (C) + (BI).
In the name of the theory SLP , S stands for strong, L for lawless and P
for proof (relating to the ”creating subject”). The proof-theoretical strength of
SLP will be investigated in section 14; in particular we will show that SLP is
stronger than the second order arithmetic. In this section we compare SLP with
a classical theory TI.
12.1. Theories TI and TIs. Theory TI is a subsystem of typed set theory
with arithmetic at the bottom level. The language of TI has variables of type
n: xn, yn, zn, . . . for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , a constant 0 of type 0, functional symbols
S,+, ·, and predicate symbols =n and ∈n (n > 0).
Terms are defined recursively as follows.
1. Any variable of type n is a term of type n.
2. The constant 0 is a term of type 0.
3. If t and τ are terms of type 0, then St, t+ τ , and t · τ are terms of type 0.
Atomic formulas:
t =n r,
t ∈n τ , where t and r are terms of type n, and τ is a term of type n+ 1.
Formulas are constructed from atomic formulas using logical connectives and
quantifiers.
For a formula ϕ, its sort srt(ϕ) is the maximal type of parameters in ϕ.
The theory TI has classical predicate logic CPC with equality axioms and
the following non-logical axioms.
1. Sx0 6= 0, Sx0 = Sy0 ⊃ x = y.
2. x0 + 0 = x, x0 + Sy0 = S(x+ y).
3. x0 · 0 = 0, x0 · Sy0 = x · y + x.
4. Induction for natural numbers: ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x0 (ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(Sx)) ⊃ ∀x0ϕ(x).
5. Comprehension axiom: ∃xn+1∀zn (z ∈ x ≡ ϕ(z)) , where srt(ϕ) 6 n + 1
and xn+1 is not a parameter of ϕ.
6. Extensionality axiom: ∀zn
(
z ∈ xn+1 ≡ z ∈ yn+1
)
⊃ x = y.
McNaughton [9] considered two typed set theories T and I, which differ from
TI only in the comprehension axiom: in T this axiom is stated without restric-
tions on the formula ϕ and in I the formula ϕ in the comprehension axiom has
no types greater than n+ 1.
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Thus, all three theories T, T I and I have impredicative comprehension axioms;
this axiom is the least predicative in T and most predicative in I.
In [9] the variables in T and I have types s = 1, 2, 3, . . . with type 1 at the
bottom level. Here we change them to s = 0, 1, 2, . . . with type 0 at the bottom
level to make the notations consistent with ours.
We denote Ts, TIs and Is the fragments of T , TI and I, respectively, in which
the types of variables are not greater than s (s = 0, 1, 2, . . . ).
12.2. Interpretation of TI in TI without extensionality. First we de-
fine a formula xn ≈n yn of the language TI by induction on n.
x0 ≈0 y0 is x = y;
xn+1 ≈n+1 yn+1 is (∀zn ∈ x)(∃un ∈ y)(z ≈n u)∧ (∀zn ∈ y)(∃un ∈ x)(z ≈n u).
Clearly, ≈n is an equivalence relation.
For any formula ϕ of TI we define ϕ∗ by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
(t =n τ)
∗ is t ≈n τ ;
(t ∈n τ)∗ is (∃zn ∈ τ)(z ≈n t);
(⊥)∗ is ⊥;
(ψθχ)∗ is ψ∗θχ∗, where θ is a logical connective ∧,∨ or ⊃;
(Qxnψ)∗ is Qxnψ∗, where Q is a quantifier ∀ or ∃.
Denote TI∗s and TI
∗ the theories TIs and TI, respectively, without the ex-
tensionality axiom.
Lemma 12.1.
TIs ⊢ ϕ⇒ TI
∗
s ⊢ ϕ¯
∗,
where ϕ¯ is a closure of formula ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of ϕ.
For logical axioms and equality axioms the proof is obvious from the definition
of ϕ∗. Therefore
CPC+s ⊢ ϕ⇒ CPC
+
s ⊢ ϕ
∗,(20)
where CPC+s is the classical predicate calculus with equality in the language of
TIs.
Of non-logical axioms we will consider the only non-trivial case of comprehen-
sion axiom:
∃xn+1∀zn(z ∈ x ≡ ψ(z)), where srt(ψ) 6 n+ 1.
Since CPC+s ⊢ z
n =n u
n ∧ ψ(z) ⊃ ψ(u), by (20) we have:
CPC+s ⊢ z
n ≈n u
n ∧ ψ∗(u) ⊃ ψ∗(z).
Clearly, srt(ψ∗) = srt(ψ), so by the comprehension axiom in TI∗s , there exists
xn+1 such that
∀zn [z ∈ x ≡ ψ∗(z)] .
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It remains to prove:
∀zn [(z ∈ x)∗ ≡ ψ∗(z)] .
If (z ∈ x)∗, then for some un ∈ x, z ≈n u. So ψ∗(u) and by (20), ψ∗(z). The
part ψ∗(z) ⊃ (z ∈ x)∗ is obvious. ⊣
12.3. Interpretation of TI∗ in SLP . First for each term t of the language
TI we define a term t′ of the language SLP . If t is a numerical term, then t′ is
obtained from t by replacing each variable x0i by xi. For n > 1, (x
n
i )
′ = Fni .
Next for each formula ϕ of TI we define a formula ϕ′ of SLP by induction on
the complexity of ϕ.
(t =n τ)
′ is t′ =n τ
′;
(t ∈0 τ)′ is ∃y [τ ′(y) = S(t′)];
for n > 1, (t ∈n τ)′ is ∃y [τ ′(y) = Nn(t′)];
⊥′ is ⊥;
(ψθχ)′ is ψ′θχ′, where θ is a logical connective ∧,∨ or ⊃;
(Qxnψ)′ is Q(xn)′ψ′, where Q is a quantifier ∀ or ∃.
Finally, for each formula ϕ of SLP we define a formula ϕ− of SLP by induction
on the complexity of ϕ.
If ϕ is an atomic formula, then ϕ− is ¬¬ϕ;
⊥− is ⊥;
(ψθχ)− is ψ−θχ−, where θ is a logical connective ∧ or ⊃;
(ψ ∨ χ)− is ¬(¬ψ− ∧ ¬χ−);
(∀Xψ)− is ∀Xψ− and
(∃Xψ)− is ¬∀X¬ψ−, where X is any variable of SLP .
Lemma 12.2.
TI∗s ⊢ ϕ⇒ SLPs ⊢ (ϕ¯
′)−.
Proof. Proof is similar to the proof in [6]. ⊣
Denote int(ϕ) = ((ϕ∗)′)−.
Theorem 12.1. 1. TIs ⊢ ϕ⇒ SLPs ⊢ int(ϕ¯).
2. TI ⊢ ϕ⇒ SLP ⊢ int(ϕ¯).
Proof. 1. It follows from Lemmas 12.1 and 12.2.
2. Follows from part 1. ⊣
Formulas of the first order arithmetic can be considered the same in TI and
SLP by identifying each variable x0i of TI with the variable xi of SLP .
Lemma 12.3. Suppose ϕ is a closed formula of first order arithmetic of the
form ∀nψ(n), where formula ψ defines a primitive recursive predicate. Then
SLP0 ⊢ int(ϕ) ≡ ϕ.
Proof. Since ψ is an arithmetic formula, then ψ∗ = ψ and ψ′ = ψ. Since
ψ defines a primitive recursive predicate, then ψ− ≡ ψ. Therefore int(ϕ) ≡
∀n int(ψ) ≡ ∀nψ ≡ ϕ. ⊣
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§13. The relative strengths of theories TIs and TI. In [1] and [2]
Bernini intended to create a strong intuitionistic theory of functionals but the
theory in [1] happened to be inconsistent and the consistency of its modification
in [2] was not proved. We proved the consistency of our intuitionistic theory
SLP of functionals by constructing the model Bs. Now we are interested in the
strength of SLP . We will show that it is the same as the strength of the classi-
cal theory TI. We will also investigate the strengths of the fragments SLPs and
TIs.
13.1. Constructing a truth predicate for TIs in TIs+1. Fix s > 1. We
will construct in TIs+1 a truth predicate Tr for formulas of the theory TIs. In
this subsection details of the construction will be described and its applications
to the relative strengths of our theories will be given in next sub-sections.
First we introduce some notations in the language TI. We will often use letters
i, j, k, l,m, n, p, q, r for natural numbers, in particular instead of variables of type
0 in the language TI.
For a natural number k, kˇ = S . . . S︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
0 is a term of the language TI.{
xk
}1
= {x};
{
xk
}n+1
= {{x}n}.
For any n = 0, 1, . . . , s we define an ordered pair [xn, yn] by induction on
n. An ordered pair
[
x0, y0
]
of natural numbers is coded by a natural number;
the code is given by a primitive recursive function as usual in the first order
arithmetic.[
xn+1, yn+1
]
= {[{0}n , zn] | z ∈ x} ∪ {[{1}n , zn] | z ∈ y} .
Thus, the ordered pair [xn, yn] of objects of type n also has type n.
Next we define a finite sequence 〈xn1 , . . . , x
n
k 〉 by induction on n.
〈x01, . . . , x
0
k〉 is coded by a natural number as usual in the first order arithmetic.
〈xn+11 , . . . , x
n+1
k 〉 =
{[
{0}n ,
{
kˇ
}n]}
∪
k⋃
i=1
{[{
iˇ
}n
, zn
]
| z ∈ xi
}
.
For arbitrary types n1, . . . , nk and m = max {n1, . . . , nk} we define:
〈xn11 , . . . , x
nk
k 〉 = 〈{x1}
m−n1 , . . . , {xk}
m−nk〉.
We will fix Go¨del numbering of all expressions of the language TIs.
For any expression g we denote xgy its Go¨del number in this numbering. tn
denotes the arithmetic term of TIs with Go¨del number n and ϕn denotes the
formula of TIs with Go¨del number n; tn or ϕn is undefined if n is not the Go¨del
number of an arithmetic term or a formula, respectively.
Next we introduce a predicate Evalk(f
k), k = 0, 1, . . . , s, with the meaning:
”f is an evaluation of all variables of type k”, that is f defines an infinite se-
quence of objects, where the ith element evaluates variable xki (i = 1, 2, . . . ). A
functional symbol V alk(f, i) is defined next; it produces the ith element of f .
For k = 1, 2, . . . , s
Evalk(f
k)⇌
(
∀xk−1 ∈ f
) [
x = ∅k−1 ∨ ∃i, zk−1(x = 〈i, z〉)
]
;
V alk(f
k, i) =
{
zk−1 | 〈i, z〉 ∈ f
}
.
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In the special case k = 0 the parameter of the formula Eval0 has type 1:
Eval0(f
1)⇌
(
∀x0 ∈ f
)
∃i, n(x = 〈i, n〉) ∧ ∀i∃!n(〈i, n〉 ∈ f).
Thus, Eval0(f
1) means f : ω → ω. Clearly,
TIs+1 ⊢ ∀i∃!n
[
(Eval0(f
1) ⊃ 〈i, n〉 ∈ f) ∧ (¬Eval0(f
1) ⊃ n = 0)
]
.
So we can introduce a functional symbol V al0(f
1, i) such that
TIs+1 ⊢ Eval0(f
1) ⊃ 〈i, V al0(f, i)〉 ∈ f.
Denote f¯ the list of variables f10 , f
1
1 , f
2
2 , . . . , f
s
s and
Eval(f¯)⇌
s∧
k=0
Evalk(fk).
For k = 1, 2, . . . , s denote
Substk(f
k, i, yk) =
{
〈j, zk−1〉 ∈ f | j 6= i
}
∪
{
〈i, zk−1〉 | z ∈ y
}
.
Then
(21) TIs+1 ⊢ Evalk(f
k) ∧ gk = Substk(f, i, y
k)
⊃ Evalk(g) ∧ V alk(g, i) = y ∧ (∀j 6= i) [V alk(g, j) = V alk(f, j)] .
Similarly, denote
Subst0(f
1, i, y0) =
{
〈j, z0〉 ∈ f | j 6= i
}
∪ {〈i, y〉} ;
then it has a property similar to (21).
Thus, Substk(f, i, y) is the new evaluation obtained from evaluation f by
changing the value for variable xki to y.
For any k = 0, 1, . . . , s, denote Subk(f¯ , i, y
k) the list of variables obtained
from list f¯ by replacing fk with Substk(fk, i, y
k).
Lemma 13.1. TIs+1 ⊢ Eval(f¯) ⊃ Eval(Subk(f¯ , i, k)), k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
Proof. Follows from the definitions of Eval and Subk. ⊣
We denote Term(n) the arithmetic formula stating that n is the Go¨del number
of an arithmetic term of TIs. We denote Subterm(m,n) the arithmetic formula
stating thatm is the Go¨del number of a sub-term of the term with Go¨del number
n.
In next few steps we define a functional symbol Arval(n, f1) that produces
the value of the arithmetic term tn under evaluation f
1.
First we define a predicate Arterm(n, f1, a1) which means that a is the set of
the values of all sub-terms of the term tn under evaluation f .
Arterm(n, f1, a1)⇌ Term(n) ∧ Eval0(f)
∧ (∀x0 ∈ a)∃m, k [x = 〈m, k〉 ∧ Subterm(m,n)]
∧ ∀m [Subterm(m,n) ⊃ B(m, a)] ,
where B(m, a)⇌ B1 ∨B2 ∨B3 ∨B4 ∨B5 and the predicates B1−B5 determine
the values of sub-terms of tn as follows.
B1 ⇌ m = x0y ∧ ∀k(〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ k = 0).
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B2 ⇌ m = xx
0
i y ∧ ∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ k = V al0(f, i)] .
B3 ⇌ ∃j {m = xStjy ∧ ∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃l(〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = Sl)]} .
Denote + as θ4 and · as θ5. For p = 4, 5,
Bp ⇌ ∃i, j {m = xtiθptjy
∧∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃r, l(〈i, r〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = rθpl)]} .
Denote
a||m = {〈j, k〉 ∈ a | Subterm(j,m)}.
Lemma 13.2. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1. Subterm(m,n) ∧ Arterm(n, f1, a1) ⊃ Arterm(m, f, a||m).
2. Arterm(n, f1, a1) ∧ Arterm(n, f, b1) ⊃ a = b.
3. Term(n) ∧ Eval0(f1) ⊃ ∃!a1Arterm(n, f, a).
Proof. 1. Assume the premises. For any i with Subterm(i,m), we have:
B(i, a) and ∀k
(
〈i, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈i, k〉 ∈ a||m
)
.(22)
To prove Arterm(m, f, a||m), it is sufficient to show for any j:
Subterm(j,m) ⊃ B(j, a||m).(23)
When tj is a constant or a variable, (23) follows from B(j, a).
Suppose j = xtp + tqy. Since B(j, a), we have for any k:
〈j, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃r, l(〈p, r〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈q, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = r + l)
and by (22):
〈j, k〉 ∈ a||m ≡ ∃r, l(〈p, r〉 ∈ a||m ∧ 〈q, l〉 ∈ a||m ∧ k = r + l),
which implies B(j, a ||m).
For other forms of tj the proof is similar.
2. Assume Arterm(n, f1, a1)∧Arterm(n, f, b1). Then Term(n) and Eval0(f).
It is sufficient to prove:
∀m [Subterm(m,n) ⊃ ∀k(〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, k〉 ∈ b)] .(24)
We will prove it by induction on m. The cases of constant 0 and variables are
obvious.
Assume (24) holds for numbers less than m. We will consider only the case
m = xti + tjy, other cases are similar. By the inductive assumption,
∀k(〈i, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈i, k〉 ∈ b) and ∀k(〈j, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈j, k〉 ∈ b).
Therefore for any k,
〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃r, l(〈i, r〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = r + l)
≡ ∃r, l(〈i, r〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ b ∧ k = r + l) ≡ 〈m, k〉 ∈ b.
3. The uniqueness was proven in part 2. We prove the existence by induction
on n.
1) If n = x0y, we take a1 = {〈n, 0〉}.
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2) If n = xx0i y, we take a
1 = {〈n, V al0(f, i)〉}.
In each case Arterm(n, f, a) is obvious.
Assume the existence for numbers less than n.
3) n = xti + tjy.
By the inductive assumption, there exist c1 and d1 such that Arterm(i, f, c)
and Arterm(j, f, d). We take
a1 = c ∪ d ∪ {〈n, r + l〉 | 〈i, r〉 ∈ c ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ d}
and prove Arterm(n, f, a).
First we prove:
∀p [Subterm(p, i) ⊃ ∀k (〈p, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈p, k〉 ∈ c)] .(25)
Assume Subterm(p, i). If ¬Subterm(p, j), then the conclusion is obvious. If
Subterm(p, j), then Arterm(p, f, c||p) and Arterm(p, f, d||p) by part 1, c||p = d||p
by part 2 and for any k:
〈p, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈p, k〉 ∈ c||p ∪ d||p ≡ 〈p, k〉 ∈ c.
(25) is proven. Similarly,
∀p [Subterm(p, j) ⊃ ∀k (〈p, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈p, k〉 ∈ d)] .(26)
To prove Arterm(n, f, a) , it is sufficient to show:
∀m [Subterm(m,n) ⊃ B(m, a)] .(27)
Assume Subterm(m,n).
i) m = n.
Applying (25) to p = i and (26) to p = j, we get for any k:
〈n, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃r, l (〈i, r〉 ∈ c ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ d ∧ k = r + l)
≡ ∃r, l (〈i, r〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = r + l) ,
which implies B(n, a).
ii) m < n.
Then Subterm(m, i)∨Subterm(m, j). We can assume Subterm(m, i) without
loss of generality. Applying (25) to each possible form of tm, we get B(m, a) due
to Arterm(i, f, c).
For example, if tm = S(tq), by (25) we have for any k:
〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, k〉 ∈ c ≡ ∃l (〈q, l〉 ∈ c ∧ k = Sl) ≡ ∃l (〈q, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = Sl) ,
which implies B(m, a).
This completes the proof for case 3). The cases of other functional symbols
are similar. ⊣
Lemma 13.3. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Subterm(m,n) ∧ Arterm(n, f1, a1)
implies each of the following formulas:
1. m = x0y ⊃ ∀k (〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ k = 0).
2. m = xx0i y ⊃ ∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ k = V al0(f, i)].
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3. m = xS(tj)y ⊃ ∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃l (〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = Sl)].
4. m = xtiθtjy ⊃ ∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃r, l (〈i, r〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = rθl)],
where θ denotes · or +.
Proof. Follows from the definition of Arterm. ⊣
Next we define a functional symbol
Art1(f1) =
{
〈n, k〉 | ∃a1(Arterm(n, f, a) ∧ 〈n, k〉 ∈ a)
}
.
Lemma 13.4.
TIs+1 ⊢ Subterm(m,n) ∧ Arterm(n, f
1, a1)
⊃ ∀k [〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, k〉 ∈ Art(f)] .
Proof. 1. Assume the premises. By Lemma 13.2.1, Arterm(m, f, a||m). Fix
k.
⇒ If 〈m, k〉 ∈ a, then 〈m, k〉 ∈ a||m and 〈m, k〉 ∈ Art(f) by the definition of
Art.
⇐ Suppose 〈m, k〉 ∈ Art(f). Then there exists b1 such that Arterm(m, f, b)
and 〈m, k〉 ∈ b. By Lemma 13.2.2, b = a||m. So 〈m, k〉 ∈ a||m and 〈m, k〉 ∈ a. ⊣
Lemma 13.5. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Eval0(f
1)
implies each of the following formulas.
1. 〈x0y, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ k = 0.
2. 〈xx0i y, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ k = V al0(f, i).
3. 〈xS(tj)y, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ ∃l (〈j, l〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ k = Sl).
4. 〈xtiθtjy, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ ∃r, l (〈i, r〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ k = rθl),
where θ denotes · or +.
Proof. Assume Eval0(f
1). By Lemma 13.2.3, for any n with Term(n), there
is a set a1 such that Arterm(n, f, a), and by Lemma 13.4:
∀m [Subterm(m,n) ⊃ ∀k (〈m, k〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, k〉 ∈ Art(f))] .(28)
1. Denote n = x0y. By (28), we have for any k:
〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ 〈n, k〉 ∈ a ≡ k = 0
by Lemma 13.3.1.
2. Denote n = xx0i y. By (28), we have for any k:
〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ 〈n, k〉 ∈ a ≡ k = V al0(f, i)
by Lemma 13.3.2.
Parts 3 is similar to part 4, which we will consider next.
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4. Denote n = xti + tjy. By (28):
∀k (〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ 〈n, k〉 ∈ a) ;
∀k (〈i, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ 〈i, k〉 ∈ a) ;
∀k (〈j, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ 〈j, k〉 ∈ a) .
By Lemma 13.3.4, for any k:
〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ≡ 〈n, k〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃r, l (〈i, r〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ a ∧ k = r + l)
≡ ∃r, l (〈i, r〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ 〈j, l〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ k = r + l) .
The case n = xti · tjy is similar. ⊣
Lemma 13.6. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1. 〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ 〈n, q〉 ∈ Art(f) ⊃ k = q.
2.∀n, f1∃!k {[Term(n) ∧ Eval0(f) ⊃ 〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f)]
∧ [¬(Term(n) ∧ Eval0(f)) ⊃ k = 0]} .
Proof. 1. Proof is by induction on n. The cases of constants and variables
follow from Lemma 13.5.1, 2.
Assume the formula holds for numbers less than n. We will consider only the
case n = xti + tjy, other cases are similar.
Suppose 〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) and 〈n, q〉 ∈ Art(f). By Lemma 13.5.4, there exist
r1, l1 and r2, l2 such that
〈i, r1〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ 〈j, l1〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ k = r1 + l1
and
〈i, r2〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ 〈j, l2〉 ∈ Art(f) ∧ q = r2 + l2.
By the inductive assumption, r1 = r2 and l1 = l2, so k = q.
2. When ¬(Term(n) ∧ Eval0(f)), it is obvious.
Assume Term(n)∧Eval0(f). The uniqueness was proven in part 1. We prove
the existence by induction on n.
If n = x0y, then k = 0.
If n = xx0i y, then k = V al0(f, i).
Assume the existence for numbers less than n. We will consider only the case
n = xti + tjy, other cases are similar. By the inductive assumption, there exist
r and l such that 〈i, r〉 ∈ Art(f) and 〈j, l〉 ∈ Art(f). Then for k = r+ l we have
〈n, k〉 ∈ Art(f) by Lemma 13.5.4. ⊣
By the previous lemma we can introduce a functional symbol Arval0(n, f1)
such that
TIs+1 ⊢ Term(n) ∧ Eval0(f
1) ⊃ 〈n,Arval(n, f)〉 ∈ Art(f).
Lemma 13.7. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Eval0(f
1)
implies each of the following formulas.
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1. Arval(x0y, f) = 0.
2. Arval(xx0i y, f) = V al0(f, i).
3. Arval(xS(tj)y, f) = S(Arval(j, f)).
4. Arval(xtiθtjy, f) = Arval(i, f)θArval(j, f), where θ denotes · or +.
5. Arval(xty, f) = t˜, where t is any arithmetic term and t˜ is obtained from t
by replacing each parameter x0i by V al0(f, i).
Proof. 1. Follows from 〈x0y, 0〉 ∈ Art(f), which is in Lemma 13.5.1.
2. Follows from 〈xx0i y, V al0(f, i)〉 ∈ Art(f), which is in Lemma 13.5.2.
3. Denote l = Arval(j, f). Then 〈j, l〉 ∈ Art(f) and by Lemma 13.5.3,
〈xS(tj)y, Sl〉 ∈ Art(f), which implies part 3.
4. We prove it for +, for · the proof is similar. Denote r = Arval(i, f) and
l = Arval(j, f). Then 〈i, r〉 ∈ Art(f), 〈j, l〉 ∈ Art(f) and by Lemma 13.5.4,
〈xti + tjy, r + l〉 ∈ Art(f), which implies part 4.
5. Proof is by induction on the complexity of t. The cases of constant 0 and
variables follow from parts 1 and 2, respectively.
Assume the formula holds for all proper sub-terms of t. We will consider only
the case t = τ + u, other cases are similar. By the inductive assumption:
Arval(xτy, f) = τ˜ and Arval(xuy, f) = u˜.
By part 4, Arval(xty, f) = τ˜ + u˜ = t˜. ⊣
We denote Form(n) the arithmetic formula stating that n is the Go¨del number
of a formula of TIs. We denote Subform(m,n) the arithmetic formula stating
that m is the Go¨del number of a sub-formula of the formula with Go¨del number
n.
Next we introduce a predicate Trset(n, bs+1), which means that b is the set
of the truth values of all evaluated sub-formulas of ϕn.
Trset(n, bs+1)⇌ Form(n) ∧
(∀xs ∈ b)∃m, f¯, δ0
[
x = 〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∧ Subform(m,n) ∧ Eval(f¯) ∧ (δ = 0 ∨ δ = 1)
]
∧ ∀m
{
Subform(m,n) ⊃ ∀f¯
[
Eval(f¯) ⊃ (〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
∧¬(〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b) ∧ A(m, f¯ , b)
]}
,
where A(m, f¯ , b) =
10∨
r=1
Ar and A1 −A10 are defined as follows.
A1 ⇌ m = x⊥y ∧ 〈m, f¯, 0〉 ∈ b.
A2 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
[
m = xxki =k x
k
j y ∧
(
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ V alk(fk, i) =k V alk(fk, j)
)]
.
A3 ⇌
s−1∨
k=1
∃i, j
[
m = xxki ∈k x
k+1
j y
∧
(
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ V alk(fk, i) ∈k V alk+1(fk+1, j)
)]
.
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A4 ⇌ ∃i, j
[
m = xti =0 tjy ∧
(
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Arval(i, f0) =0 Arval(j, f0)
)]
.
A5 ⇌ ∃i, j
[
m = xti ∈0 x
1
jy ∧
(
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Arval(i, f0) ∈0 V al1(f1, j)
)]
.
Denote the logical connective ∧ as θ6, ∨ as θ7 and ⊃ as θ8. For p = 6, 7, 8,
Ap ⇌ ∃i, j
[
m = xϕiθpϕjy ∧
(
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡
(
〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b θp〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
))]
.
Denote Q9 the quantifier ∀ and Q10 the quantifier ∃. For p = 9, 10,
Ap ⇌
s∨
k=0
∃i, j
[
m = xQpx
k
i ϕjy
∧
(
〈m, f¯, 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Qpy
k(〈j, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ b)
)]
.
Denote
b|m = {〈j, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b | Subform(j,m)}.
Lemma 13.8. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1. Subform(m,n) ∧ Trset(n, bs+1) ⊃ Trset(m, b|m).
2. Trset(n, bs+1) ∧ Trset(n, cs+1) ⊃ b = c.
3. Form(n) ⊃ ∃!bs+1Trset(n, b).
Proof. 1. Assume the premises. For any j with Subform(j,m) we have:
∀f¯
[
Eval(f¯) ⊃ A(j, f¯ , b)
]
(29)
and
∀f¯ , δ0
[
〈j, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈j, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b|m
]
.(30)
To prove Trset(m, b|m), it is sufficient to show for any j:
Subform(j,m) ⊃ ∀f¯
[
Eval(f¯) ⊃ A(j, f¯ , b|m)
]
.(31)
When ϕj is an atomic formula or ⊥, (31) follows from (29).
Suppose j = x∃xki ϕpy. Consider f¯ with Eval(f¯). By (29),
〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∃yk
(
〈p, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ b
)
and by (30):
〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b|m ≡ ∃y
k
(
〈p, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ b|m
)
,
which implies A(j, f¯ , b|m).
In the cases of other quantifiers and logical connectives the proof is similar.
2. Assume the premises. It is sufficient to prove:
∀m
[
Subform(m,n) ⊃ (〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c)
]
.(32)
If (32) is proven, then for any m, f¯ we have:
〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ b ≡ 〈m, f¯, 1〉 /∈ c ≡ 〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ c,
and this implies b = c.
We prove (32) by induction on m.
Case 1: m = x⊥y. Then 〈m, f¯, 1〉 /∈ b and 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ c.
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Case 2: m = xti ∈0 x1jy. Proof follows from the definition of A5. The cases of
other atomic formulas are similar.
Assume (32) holds for numbers less than m.
Case 3: m = x∃xki ϕjy. By the inductive assumption:
∀f¯(〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c).
So for any f¯ :
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∃yk(〈j, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ b)
≡ ∃yk(〈j, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ c) ≡ 〈m, f¯, 1〉 ∈ c.
The cases of other quantifiers and logical connectives are similar.
3. The uniqueness was proven in part 2. We will prove the existence by
induction on n.
Case 1: n = x⊥y. We take bs+1 = {〈n, f¯ , 0〉 | Eval(f¯)}.
Case 2: n = xti ∈0 x1jy. We take
bs+1 =
{
〈n, f¯ , 1〉 | Eval(f¯) ∧ Arval(i, f0) ∈0 V al1(f1, j)
}
∪
{
〈n, f¯ , 0〉 | Eval(f¯) ∧ Arval(i, f0) /∈0 V al1(f1, j)
}
.
Clearly Trset(n, b) holds.
Assume the existence for numbers less than n.
Case 3: n = xϕi ∨ ϕjy. By the inductive assumption there exist sets c1 and
d1 such that Trset(i, c) and Trset(j, d). Denote
ϕ(i, j, f¯)⇌ 〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c ∨ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ d.
We take
bs+1 = c ∪ d ∪
{
〈n, f¯ , 1〉 | Eval(f¯) ∧ ϕ(i, j, f¯)
}
∪
{
〈n, f¯ , 0〉 | Eval(f¯) ∧ ¬ϕ(i, j, f¯)
}
.
First we prove:
∀p
[
Subform(p, i) ⊃ ∀f¯ , δ0
(
〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c
)]
.(33)
Assume the premises of (33). If ¬Subform(p, j), then the conclusion is obvi-
ous. If Subform(p, j), then Trset(p, c|p) and Trset(p, d|p) by part 1, c|p = d|p
by part 2 and for any f¯ , δ0:
〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c|p ∪ d|p ≡ 〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c|p ≡ 〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c.
(33) is proven. Similarly,
∀p
[
Subform(p, j) ⊃ ∀f¯ , δ0
(
〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ d
)]
.(34)
To prove Trset(n, b), it is sufficient to show:
(35) ∀m
{
Subform(m,n) ⊃ ∀f¯
[
Eval(f¯)
⊃ ¬(〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b) ∧ A(m, f¯ , b)
]}
.
Assume Subform(m,n).
i) m = n.
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Suppose Eval(f¯). Then ¬(〈n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b) follows from the defini-
tion of b.
Applying (33) to p = i and (34) to p = j, we get:
〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ϕ(i, j, f¯) ≡ 〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c ∨ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ d ≡ 〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b,
which implies A(n, f¯ , b).
ii) m < n.
Then Subform(m, i)∨ Subform(m, j). We can assume Subform(m, i) with-
out loss of generality. Due to Trset(i, c) we have ¬(〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ c ∧ 〈m, f¯, 1〉 ∈ c)
and by (33),
¬(〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b).
A(m, f¯ , b) is also also derived from Trset(i, c) by applying (33) to each possible
form of the formula ϕm.
This completes the proof for case 3. The cases of other logical connectives and
quantifiers are similar. ⊣
Lemma 13.9. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Subform(m,n) ∧ Eval(f¯) ∧ Trset(n, bs+1)
implies each of the following formulas.
1. 〈m, f¯, 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b.
2. ¬(〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b).
3. 〈x⊥y, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b.
4. m = xxki =k x
k
j y ⊃
[
〈m, f¯, 1〉 ∈ b ≡ V alk(fk, i) =k V alk(fk, j)
]
,
k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
5. m = xxki ∈k x
k+1
j y ⊃
[
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ V alk(fk, i) ∈k V alk+1(fk+1, j)
]
,
k = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1.
6. m = xti =0 tjy ⊃
[
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Arval(i, f0) =0 Arval(j, f0)
]
.
7. m = xti ∈0 x1jy ⊃
[
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Arval(i, f0) ∈0 V al1(f1, j)
]
.
8. m = xϕiθϕjy ⊃
[
〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡
(
〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b θ〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
)]
, where θ is a
logical connective ∧,∨ or ⊃.
9. m = xQxki ϕjy ⊃
[
〈m, f¯, 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Qyk(〈j, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ b)
]
,
k = 0, 1, . . . , s, where Q is a quantifier ∀ or ∃.
Proof. Follows from the definition of Trset. ⊣
We define
Truths+1 =
{
xs | ∃n, bs+1(Trset(n, b) ∧ x ∈ b)
}
.
Thus, Truth is the set of the truth values of all evaluated formulas of TIs.
Lemma 13.10. TIs+1 ⊢ Subform(m,n) ∧ Trset(n, bs+1)
⊃
(
〈m, f¯ , δ0〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ Truth
)
.
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Proof. Assume the premises. Then Trset(m, b|m).
⇒ If 〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b, then 〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b|m and 〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ Truth by the definition
of the set Truth.
⇐ Suppose 〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ Truth. Then there is cs+1 with Trset(m, c) and
〈m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c. By Lemma 13.8.2, c = b |m, so 〈m, f¯, δ〉 ∈ b|m and 〈m, f¯, δ〉 ∈ b. ⊣
Finally we introduce the truth predicate Tr:
Tr(n, f¯)⇌ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ Truth.
Clearly, Tr depends on s but we will omit s for brevity.
Lemma 13.11. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Eval(f¯)
implies each of the following formulas.
1. Form(n) ⊃
(
¬Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ Truth
)
.
2. Tr(x⊥y, f¯) ≡⊥.
3. Tr(xxki =k x
k
j y, f¯) ≡ V alk(fk, i) =k V alk(fk, j), k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
4. Tr(xxki ∈k x
k+1
j y, f¯) ≡ V alk(fk, i) ∈k V alk+1(fk+1, j), k = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1.
5. Tr(xti =0 tjy, f¯) ≡ Arval(i, f0) =0 Arval(j, f0).
6. Tr(xti ∈0 x1jy, f¯) ≡ Arval(i, f0) ∈0 V al1(f1, j).
7. Tr(xϕiθϕjy, f¯) ≡ Tr(i, f¯)θT r(j, f¯), where θ is a logical connective ∧,∨ or
⊃.
8. Tr(xQxki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ Qy
kTr(j, Subk(f¯ , i, y)), k = 0, 1, . . . , s, where Q is a
quantifier ∀ or ∃.
9. Tr(xϕy, f¯) ≡ ϕ˜, where ϕ is any formula of TIs and ϕ˜ is obtained from ϕ
by replacing each parameter xki by V alk(fk, i).
10. Tr(xϕy, f¯) ≡ ϕ for any closed formula ϕ of TIs.
Proof. Assume Eval(f¯). By Lemma 13.8.3, for any n with Form(n) there
is a set bs+1 such that Trset(n, b) and by Lemma 13.10:
∀m
[
Subform(m,n) ⊃ ∀f¯(Tr(m, f¯) ≡ 〈m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
]
.(36)
1. By (36) for any n with Form(n):
¬Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ b ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ Truth
by Lemma 13.9.2, 1 and Lemma 13.10.
2. Denote n = x⊥y.
By (36) and Lemma 13.9.3, 2, Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ⊥.
Parts 3-5 are similar to part 6, which we consider next.
6. Denote n = xti ∈0 x1jy. By (36) and Lemma 13.9.7,
Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Arval(i, f0) ∈0 V al1(f1, j).
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7. Denote n = xϕi ∨ ϕjy. By (36):
∀f¯
[
Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
,
∀f¯
[
Tr(i, f¯) ≡ 〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
,
∀f¯
[
Tr(j, f¯) ≡ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
.
By Lemma 13.9.8,
Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ Tr(i, f¯) ∨ Tr(j, f¯).
The cases of other logical connectives are similar.
8. Denote n = x∀xki ϕjy. By (36):
∀f¯
[
Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
,
∀f¯
[
Tr(j, f¯) ≡ 〈j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
.
By Lemma 13.9.9,
Tr(n, f¯) ≡ 〈n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀yk
(
〈j, Subk(f¯ , i, y), 1〉 ∈ b
)
≡ ∀ykTr(j, Subk(f¯ , i, y)).
The case of the quantifier ∃ is similar.
9. Proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
1) If ϕ is ⊥, then the formula follows from part 2.
2) Suppose ϕ is t ∈0 x1j . By part 6,
Tr(xϕy, f¯) ≡ Arval(xty, f0) ∈0 V al1(f1, j) ≡ t˜ ∈0 V al1(f1, j) ≡ ϕ˜
by Lemma 13.7.5.
Assume part 9 holds for all proper sub-formulas of ϕ.
3) Suppose ϕ is ψ ⊃ χ. By the inductive assumption:
Tr(xψy, f¯) ≡ ψ˜ and Tr(xχy, f¯) ≡ χ˜.
By part 7:
Tr(xϕy, f¯) ≡
[
Tr(xψy, f¯) ⊃ Tr(xχy, f¯)
]
≡ (ψ˜ ⊃ χ˜) ≡ ϕ˜.
The cases of other logical connectives are similar.
4) Suppose ϕ is ∃xrjψ(xj). By part 8:
Tr(xϕy, f¯) ≡ ∃yrTr(xψy, Subr(f¯ , j, y)).
By the inductive assumption,
Tr(xψy, Subr(f¯ , j, y)) ≡ ψ˜(y),
where ψ˜(y) is obtained from ψ(xj) by replacing xj by y and each other parameter
xki by V alk(fk, i). So
Tr(xϕy, f¯) ≡ ∃yrψ˜(y) ≡ ϕ˜.
The case of quantifier ∀ is similar.
10. Follows from part 9, since for a closed formula ϕ, ϕ˜ = ϕ. ⊣
Theorem 13.1. TIs+1 ⊢ PrfTIs(m) ∧ Eval(f¯) ⊃ Tr(m, f¯).
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Proof. We will describe derivation in TIs+1 informally by induction on the
derivation of ϕm in TIs.
Suppose m is the Go¨del number of the comprehension axiom:
∃xn+1j ∀x
n
i (xi ∈ xj ≡ ϕ) ,
where srt(ϕ) 6 n+ 1 and xn+1j is not a parameter of ϕ.
By Lemma 13.11.10,
Tr(xϕy, Subn(f¯ , i, z)) ≡ ϕ˜,
where ϕ˜ is obtained from ϕ by replacing parameter xni by z and each other
parameter xkr by V alk(fk, r).
If k > 1, then V alk(fk, r) has only a parameter of type k and V al0(f1, r)
has only a parameter of type 1. So srt(ϕ˜) = max(srt(ϕ), 1) 6 n + 1. By the
comprehension axiom in TIs+1, there exists a set y
n+1 = {zn | ϕ˜}. Then
∀zn
[
z ∈ y ≡ Tr(xϕy, Subn(f¯ , i, z))
]
,
which implies Tr(m, f¯).
For all other axioms and derivation rules the theorem statement follows from
Lemma 13.11. ⊣
13.2. The strengths of theories TIs and TI. For an axiomatic theory A
and a fixed Go¨del numbering of its expressions denote ProofA(n,m) the arith-
metic formula stating that a formula with Go¨del number m has a proof with
Go¨del number n in the theory A. Denote PrfA(m) ⇌ ∃nProofA(n,m) and
Con(A) ⇌ ¬PrfA(x⊥y). Thus, Con(A) is the arithmetic formula that states
the consistency of A. Detailed constructions of these formulas can be found, for
example, in [10].
For next theorems we fix a trivial evaluation f¯ : fkk =
{
∅
k−1
}
, k = 1, . . . , s,
and f10 = {〈i, 0〉 | i = i}. Then Eval(f¯).
Theorem 13.2. TIs+1 ⊢ Con(TIs), s = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof. Suppose s > 1. If TIs+1 is inconsistent, then any formula can be
derived in it. We assume that it is consistent. We will describe derivation in
TIs+1 informally.
Assume PrfTIs(x⊥y). By Theorem 13.1, Tr(x⊥y, f¯) that contradicts Lemma
13.11.2. Therefore ¬PrfTIs (x⊥y).
If s = 0, then the proof has similar steps, just the definition of the truth
predicate Tr0 does not contain clauses for ∈k. ⊣
The proofs of the remaining lemmas and theorems in this subsection are similar
to the corresponding proofs in [9].
Lemma 13.12. TI2 ⊢ Con(In) ⊃ Con(In+1).
Proof. In Theorem 4.3 in [9] it was proven that T2 ⊢ Con(In) ⊃ Con(In+1).
The same proof applies to TI2. ⊣
Theorem 13.3. TI2 ⊢ Con(In) for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
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Proof. The proof is by induction on n.
n = 0: TI0 = I0 = PA, where PA is the first order arithmetic (Peano
arithmetic). By Theorem 13.2, TI1 ⊢ Con(I0) and therefore TI2 ⊢ Con(I0).
Assume TI2 ⊢ Con(In). Then by Lemma 13.12, TI2 ⊢ Con(In+1). ⊣
Theorem 13.4. 1. TI3 ⊢ Con(I).
2. TI ⊢ Con(I).
Proof. 1. We will describe derivation in TI3 informally. Assume PrfI(x⊥y).
Since every proof in I is finite, for some n we have:
PrfIn(x⊥y).(37)
By formalizing Theorem 13.3, we get PrfTI2(xCon(In)y). By Theorem 13.1 for
s = 2, Tr(xCon(In)y, f¯) and by Lemma 13.11.10, Con(In), since it is a closed
formula. This contradicts (37).
2. Follows from part 1. ⊣
§14. Comparison of theories SLP and TI.
14.1. Interpretation of SLPs in TIs. Here we formalize our proofs about
the model Bs in the theory TIs for a fixed s > 1. First we introduce some
notations in TIs.
By induction on n we define (yn)i.(
y0
)
i
is the ith element of y when y is regarded as the numerical code of a
finite sequence of natural numbers, it is given by a primitive recursive function.(
yn+1
)
i
= {zn | [{i+ 1}n , z] ∈ y} .
Clearly, TIs ⊢ (〈xn1 , . . . , x
n
k 〉)i−1 = xi, where i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
All the aforementioned sets can be constructed in TIs using its limited com-
prehension axiom.
For types n1, . . . , nk and m = max {n1, . . . , nk} we define:
yn1+11 × . . .× y
nk+1
k =
{
〈xn11 , . . . , x
nk
k 〉 |
k∧
i=1
(xi ∈ yi)
}
.
Next we introduce a formula Seq(xn+1, k) of TIs, which means that x is a
sequence of length k. Seq(x0, k) is an arithmetic formula stating that the natural
number x is a code for a sequence of natural numbers of length k.
Seq(xn+1, k)⇌
∀un (u ∈ x ≡ u = [{0}n , {k}n] ∨ ∃i, zn (1 6 i 6 k ∧ u = [{i}n , z])) .
Clearly,
TIs ⊢ 〈x
n1
1 , . . . , x
nk
k 〉 = 〈y
n1
1 , . . . , y
nk
k 〉 ⊃
k∧
i=1
(xi = yi);
TIs ⊢ y
m = 〈xn11 , . . . , x
nk
k 〉 ⊃ Seq(y, k˜),
where m = max {n1, . . . , nk}.
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The relation 6 on finite sequences is defined by:
xn 6 yn ⇌ ∃k, l [Seq(x, k) ∧ Seq(y, l) ∧ l 6 k ∧ (∀i < l) ((x)i = (y)i)] .
For fixed i and n 6 m the following formula states: ”if ym is a sequence, then
xn is its ith element, and ∅ otherwise”.
eltm,n(x
n, ym, i)⇌ ∃k
[
Seq(y, k) ∧ i < k ∧ (y)i = {x}
m−n
]
∨
[
¬∃k, zn
(
Seq(y, k) ∧ i < k ∧ (y)i = {z}
m−n
)
∧ x = ∅
]
.
Clearly, TIs ⊢ ∀i, ym∃!xneltm,n(x, y, i).
So we can introduce a functional symbol 〈ym〉n,i in TIs for any n 6 m 6 s. It
is easy to prove that:
TIs ⊢ y
m = 〈xn11 , . . . , x
nk
k 〉 ⊃ 〈y〉ni,i−1 = xi.
Similarly we introduce a functional symbol lth(x) such that
TIs ⊢ Seq(x
n, k) ⊃ lth(x) = k.
Functions and partial functions are defined as sets of ordered pairs as usual.
The predicates ”S is a path in d”, ”f is monotonic on d”, ”f is complete on d”
are easily expressed in the language TIs. Thus, for a fixed partial order 6 on d,
”S is a path in d”
⇌ (∀x, y ∈ S)(x 6 y ∨ y 6 x) ∧ (∀x ∈ d)(∀y ∈ S)(x 6 y ∨ y 6 x ⊃ x ∈ S);
”f is monotonic on d”
⇌ (∀x, y ∈ d)(x 6 y ⊃ ∀n, z (〈〈y, n〉, z〉 ∈ f ⊃ 〈〈x, n〉, z〉 ∈ f) ;
”f is complete on d”
⇌ ∀S [”S is a path in d” ⊃ ∀n(∃x ∈ S)∃y (〈〈x, n〉, y〉 ∈ f)] .
Here the variables have appropriate types depending on the type of d.
Next we formalize the Definition 4.1 of the Beth model Bs in TIs. Most of it
is straightforward. We will elaborate only on non-trivial parts. The definition
of νk(ξ) is formalized as follows:
νk(ξ) =
{
〈〈x, n〉, y〉 | n < lh(x) ∧ 〈〈n, (〈x〉k−1,k−1)n〉, y〉 ∈ ξ
}
.
For each k = 0, 1, . . . , s− 1, the sets ak, dk, bk, ck and lk have type k+1. The
set M = ds−1 has type s. In theory TIs we use predicates (not sets) for as, bs, cs
and ls. For example, for as the corresponding predicate is
As(f
s)⇌ f : (ds−1 × ω) 99K as−1
∧ ”f is monotonic on ds−1” ∧ ”f is complete on ds−1”
and it can be expressed by a formula of TIs. For universality we will use the
notation f s ∈ as for the predicate As(f s), as well as the notations f s ∈ bs,
f s ∈ cs and f s ∈ ls standing for corresponding predicates.
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For x, y ∈ dk we define:
x k y ⇌
k∧
i=0
(〈x〉i,i 6 〈y〉i,i) .
It is easy to see that for any yk ∈ dk with lh(y) = m (k = 0, 1, . . . , s− 1), for
any n 6 k and j < m:
〈y〉n,n ∈ a
(m)
n and (〈y〉n,n)j ∈ an.
For any yk ∈ dk and n = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1 we denote
segmentn(y) = 〈〈y〉0,0, 〈y〉1,1, . . . , 〈y〉n−1,n−1, 〉.
Clearly the type of segmentn(y) is n− 1. As in the informal definition, we will
use the notation y¯(n) for segmentn(y); it denotes the initial segment of y of
length n. Here y¯(n) is introduced only for y ∈ dk and not for arbitrary y.
Suppose ϕ is an evaluated formula of SLPs. Denote ints(ϕ) the formula of
TIs that expresses the relation Bs  ϕ. For any ϕ, ints(ϕ) can be formally
defined following the Definitions 2.2 and 4.1.
Theorem 14.1. SLPs ⊢ ϕ⇒ TIs ⊢ ints(ϕ¯).
Proof. The proofs in Sections 4-9 are easily formalized using the aforemen-
tioned notations. That implies the theorem. ⊣
Theorem 14.2. 1. The theories SLPs and TIs are equiconsistent.
2. The theories SLP and TI are equiconsistent.
Proof. Part 1 follows from Theorem 12.1.1 and Theorem 14.1. Part 2 follows
from Theorem 12.1.2 and part 1, since any derivation in SLP is finite, therefore
it is a derivation in SLPs for some s. ⊣
14.2. Constructing a forcing predicate for SLPs in TIs+1. Fix s > 1.
In TIs+1 we will construct a formula Fr(α, n, f¯ ) expressing the forcing predicate
α  ϕn(f¯) in the Beth model Bs. Thus, Fr(α, n, f¯) means that the formula
of SLPs with Go¨del number n under evaluation f¯ is forced at node α. The
construction follows similar steps as the construction of the truth predicate Tr
in the previous section, but with a few extra details. In this subsection details of
the construction will be described and its applications to the relative strengths
of our theories will be given in next sub-section.
We will use the following precise notations for variables of SLPs. For n =
1, 2, . . . , s; i = 1, 2, . . . :
xi are variables over natural numbers,
Fni are variables over n-functionals,
Ani are variables over lawlike n-functionals,
Fni are variables over lawless n-functionals.
We will map variables of SLPs to variables of TIs as follows:
xi → x0i ;
Fni → x
n
3i;
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Ani → x
n
3i+1;
Fni → x
n
3i+2.
The definitions of the domains for k-functionals, lawlike k-functionals, lawless
k-functionals, and the sets dk and ck are easily formalised in TIs+1 as in the
previous sub-section. All the sets ak, bk, lk, dk, and ck have type k + 1, includ-
ing the case k = s (unlike the previous sub-section, where as, bs and ls were
predicates). The domain M = ds−1 has type s.
We will fix Go¨del numbering of all expressions of the language SLPs. For any
expression g we denote xgy its Go¨del number in this numbering.
The functional symbol V alk(f, i) that produces the ith element of f was in-
troduced in section 13. Next we introduce a predicate Evlk(f
k), k = 1, . . . , s,
with the meaning: ”f is an evaluation of all variables for k-functionals”.
Evlk(f
k)⇌
(
∀xk−1 ∈ f
)
∃i, zk−1(x = 〈i, z〉)
∧ ∀i [V alk(f, 3i) ∈ ak ∧ V alk(f, 3i+ 1) ∈ bk ∧ V alk(f, 3i+ 2) ∈ lk] .
For type 0 the predicate Evl0(f
1) is the same as Eval0(f
1) defined in section
13.
As before we denote f¯ the list of variables f10 , f
1
1 , f
2
2 , . . . , f
s
s and
Evl(f¯)⇌
s∧
k=0
Evlk(fk).
The functional symbol Substk(f
k, i, yk) and notation Subk(f¯ , i, y
k) were de-
fined in section 13 (k = 0, 1, . . . , s).
Lemma 14.1. Suppose k = 1, 2, . . . , s. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Evl(f¯) implies each of the following formulas:
1. Evl(Sub0(f¯ , i, u
0));
2. uk ∈ ak ⊃ Evl(Subk(f¯ , 3i, u));
3. uk ∈ bk ⊃ Evl(Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u));
4. uk ∈ lk ⊃ Evl(Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u)).
Proof. Follows from the definitions of Evl and Subk. ⊣
We denote Fnlk(n) the arithmetic formula stating that n is the Go¨del number
of a k-functional (k = 1, 2, . . . , s). We denote Fnl0(n) the arithmetic formula
stating that n is the Go¨del number of a term. We denote Zn the term or k-
functional of SLPs with Go¨del number n and
Subfnlk(m,n)⇌ Fnlk(m) ∧ ”Zm is a part of Zn”.
Thus, for k = 1, 2, . . . , s, Subfnlk(m,n) means that the k-functional Zm is a
sub-functional of Zn, and Subfnl0(m,n) means that the term Zm is a sub-term
of Zn.
Next we define a predicate Fnterm(α, f¯ , n, as+1), which means that a is the
set of the values at node α of all sub-terms and sub-functionals of Zn under
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evaluation f¯ . The predicate uses the interpretations Kˆk and Nˆk from Definition
4.1, which are easily formalised.
Fnterm(αs−1, n, f¯ , as+1)⇌ α ∈M ∧
(
s∨
k=0
Fnlk(n)
)
∧Evl(f¯)
∧ (∀xs ∈ a)∃m
[
s∨
k=0
(
Subfnlk(m,n) ∧ ∃u
k(x = 〈m,u〉)
)]
∧ ∀m
s∧
k=0
[Subfnlk(m,n) ⊃ Ck(m, a)] , where
Cs(m, a)⇌
10∨
r=1
Cs,r; for k = 0, 1, . . . , s− 1, Ck(m, a)⇌
11∨
r=1
Ck,r
and Ck,1 − Ck,11 determine the value of Zm as follows.
Ck,1 ⇌ m = x0y ∧ ∀y
s (〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {0}s) .
Ck,2 ⇌ m = xK
ky ∧ ∀ys
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y =
{
Kˆk
}s−k)
.
Ck,3 ⇌ ∃i [m = xxiy ∧ ∀y
s (〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V al0(f0, i)}
s)] .
Ck,4 ⇌ ∃i
[
m = xF ki y ∧ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i)}
s−k
)]
.
Ck,5 ⇌ ∃i
[
m = xAki y ∧ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i+ 1)}
s−k
)]
.
Ck,6 ⇌ ∃i
[
m = xFki y ∧ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i+ 2)}
s−k
)]
.
Ck,7 ⇌ ∃j
[
m = xS(Zj)y ∧ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃u0 (〈j, u〉 ∈ a ∧ y = {S(u)}s)
)]
.
Denote + as θ8 and · as θ9. For p = 8, 9,
Ck,p ⇌ ∃j, i [m = xZjθpZiy
∧∀ys
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃u0, v0 (〈j, u〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ a ∧ y = {uθpv}
s
)
)]
.
Ck,10 ⇌ ∃j
{
m = xNk(Zj)y
∧∀ys
[
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃uk
(
〈j, u〉 ∈ a ∧ y =
{
Nˆk(u)
}s−k)]}
.
Ck,11 ⇌ ∃j, i
{
m = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y ∧ ∀y
s [〈m, y〉 ∈ a
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk (〈j, w〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ a
∧〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)]}
.
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Denote
a ||m=
{
〈j, ys〉 ∈ a |
s∨
p=0
Subfnlp(j,m)
}
.
Lemma 14.2. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1. Subfnlk(m,n) ∧ Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , as+1) ⊃ Fnterm(α,m, f¯ , a ||m),
k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
2. Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , as+1) ∧ Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , bs+1) ⊃ a = b.
3. Fnlk(n) ∧ α ∈M ∧ Evl(f¯) ⊃ ∃!as+1Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a), k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
Proof. 1. Assume the premises. For any i with Subfnlp(i,m), p = 0, 1, . . . , s,
we have:
Cp(i, a) and ∀y
s (〈i, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈i, y〉 ∈ a ||m) .(38)
To prove Fnterm(α,m, f¯ , a ||m), it is sufficient to show for any j:
Subfnlp(j,m) ⊃ Cp(j, a ||m).(39)
When Zj is a constant or a variable, (39) follows from Cp(j, a).
Suppose j = xApp+1(Zq, Zr)y. Since Cp(j, a), we have for any y
s:
〈j, y〉 ∈ a
≡ ∃wp+1, v0, up
[
〈q, w〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈r, v〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈〈α¯(p+ 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−p
]
and by (38):
〈j, y〉 ∈ a ||m≡ ∃w
p+1, v0, up [〈q, w〉 ∈ a ||m
∧〈r, v〉 ∈ a ||m ∧〈〈α¯(p+ 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}
s−p
]
,
which implies Cp(j, a ||m).
For other forms of Zj the proof is similar.
2. Assume Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , as+1) and Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , bs+1). Then α ∈ M ,
Evl(f¯) and Fnlq(n) for some q = 0, 1, . . . , s. It is sufficient to prove:
∀m
[
s∨
k=0
Subfnlk(m,n) ⊃ ∀y
s(〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, y〉 ∈ b)
]
.(40)
We will prove it by induction on m. The cases of constants and variables are
obvious.
Assume (40) holds for numbers less than m. We will consider the only non-
trivial case m = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y. By the inductive assumption,
∀ys(〈j, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈j, y〉 ∈ b) and ∀ys(〈i, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈i, y〉 ∈ b).
Therefore for any ys,
〈m, y〉 ∈ a
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
≡ 〈m, y〉 ∈ b.
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3. The uniqueness was proven in part 2. We prove the existence by induction
on n.
1) If n = x0y, we take as+1 = {〈n, 0〉}.
2) If n = xKky, we take as+1 = {〈n, Kˆk〉}.
3) If n = xxiy, we take a
s+1 = {〈n, V al0(f0, i)〉}.
4) If n = xF ki y, we take a
s+1 = {〈n, V alk(fk, 3i)〉}.
5) If n = xAki y, we take a
s+1 = {〈n, V alk(fk, 3i+ 1)〉}.
6) If n = xFki y, we take a
s+1 = {〈n, V alk(fk, 3i+ 2)〉}.
In each case Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a) is obvious.
Assume the existence for numbers less than n.
7) n = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y.
By the inductive assumption, there exist sets cs+1 and ds+1 such that
Fnterm(α, j, f¯ , c) ∧ Fnterm(α, i, f¯ , d).
We take as+1 =
= c ∪ d ∪ {〈n, uk〉 | ∃wk+1, v0 (〈j, w〉 ∈ c ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ d ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w)}
and prove Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a).
First we prove:
∀p [Subfnlq(p, j) ⊃ ∀u
q (〈p, u〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈p, u〉 ∈ c)] , q = 0, 1, . . . , s.(41)
Assume Subfnlq(p, j). If ¬Subfnlq(p, i), then the conclusion is obvious. If
Subfnlq(p, i), then Fnterm(α, p, f¯ , c ||p) and Fnterm(α, p, f¯ , d ||p) by part 1,
c ||p= d ||p by part 2 and for any u
q:
〈p, u〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈p, u〉 ∈ c ||p ∪d ||p≡ 〈p, u〉 ∈ c.
(41) is proven. Similarly,
∀p [Subfnlq(p, i) ⊃ ∀u
q (〈p, u〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈p, u〉 ∈ d)] , q = 0, 1, . . . , s.(42)
To prove Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a) , it is sufficient to show:
∀m
s∧
q=0
[Subfnlq(m,n) ⊃ Cq(m, a)] .(43)
Assume Subfnlq(m,n).
i) m = n.
Then q = k. Applying (41) to p = j and (42) to p = i, we get for any ys:
〈n, y〉 ∈ a
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ c ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ d ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
which implies Ck(n, a).
ii) m < n.
Then Subfnlq(m, j) ∨ Subfnlq(m, i). We can assume Subfnlq(m, j) without
loss of generality. Applying (41) to each possible form of Zm, we get Cq(m, a)
due to Fnterm(α, j, f¯ , c).
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For example, if Zm = N
q(Zr), by (41) we have for any y
s:
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, y〉 ∈ c ≡ ∃uq
(
〈r, u〉 ∈ c ∧ y = {Nˆ q(u)}s−q
)
≡ ∃uq
(
〈r, u〉 ∈ a ∧ y = {Nˆ q(u)}s−q
)
,
which implies Cq(m, a).
This completes the proof for case 7). The cases of other functional symbols
are similar. ⊣
Lemma 14.3. Suppose k = 0, 1, . . . , s. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
Subfnlk(m,n) ∧ Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a
s+1)
implies each of the following formulas:
1. m = x0y ⊃ ∀ys (〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {0}s).
2. m = xKky ⊃ ∀ys
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y =
{
Kˆk
}s−k)
.
3. m = xxiy ⊃ ∀ys (〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V al0(f0, i)}
s
).
4. m = xF ki y ⊃ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i)}
s−k
)
.
5. m = xAki y ∧ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i+ 1)}
s−k
)
.
6. m = xFki y ⊃ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i+ 2)}
s−k
)
.
7. m = xS(Zj)y ⊃ ∀ys
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃u0 (〈j, u〉 ∈ a ∧ y = {S(u)}s)
)
.
8. m = xZjθZiy ⊃ ∀ys (〈m, y〉 ∈ a
≡ ∃u0, v0 (〈j, u〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ a ∧ y = {uθv}s)
)
, where θ denotes · or +.
9. m = xNk(Zj)y
⊃ ∀ys
[
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃uk
(
〈j, u〉 ∈ a ∧ y =
{
Nˆk(u)
}s−k)]
.
10. m = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y ⊃ ∀ys
[
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk (〈j, w〉 ∈ a
∧〈i, v〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)]
.
Proof. Follows from the definition of Fnterm. ⊣
Next we define a functional symbol Fnt(α, f¯):
Fnts+1(α, f¯ ) =
{
〈n, ys〉 | ∃as+1(Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a) ∧ 〈n, y〉 ∈ a)
}
.
Lemma 14.4. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1.Subfnlk(m,n) ∧ Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a
s+1)
⊃ ∀ys
[
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯)
]
, k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
2.〈n, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ⊃
s∨
k=0
[
Fnlk(n) ∧ ∃u
k
(
y = {u}s−k
)]
.
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Proof. 1. Assume the premises. By Lemma 14.2.1, Fnterm(α,m, f¯ , a ||m).
Fix ys.
⇒ If 〈m, y〉 ∈ a, then 〈m, y〉 ∈ a ||m and 〈m, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) by the definition
of Fnt.
⇐ Suppose 〈m, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯). Then there is bs+1 with Fnterm(α,m, f¯ , b)
and 〈m, y〉 ∈ b. By Lemma 14.2.2, b = a ||m. So 〈m, y〉 ∈ a ||m and 〈m, y〉 ∈ a.
2. Suppose 〈n, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯). Then for some as+1, Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a) and
〈n, y〉 ∈ a. The conclusion follows from the definition of Fnterm. ⊣
Lemma 14.5. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
α ∈M ∧Evl(f¯)
implies each of the following formulas.
1. 〈x0y, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ y = {0}s.
2. 〈xKky, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ y =
{
Kˆk
}s−k
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
3. 〈xxiy, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ y = {V al0(f0, i)}
s
.
4. 〈xF ki y, y
s〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i)}
s−k
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
5. 〈xAki y, y
s〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i+ 1)}
s−k, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
6. 〈xFki y, y
s〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i+ 2)}
s−k
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
7. 〈xS(Zj)y, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ ∃u0
(
〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ y = {S(u)}s
)
.
8. 〈xZjθZiy, y
s〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ ∃u0, v0
(
〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯)
∧〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ y = {uθv}s
)
, where θ denotes · or +.
9. 〈xNk(Zj)y, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯)
≡ ∃uk
(
〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ y =
{
Nˆk(u)
}s−k)
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
10. 〈xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y, ys〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯)
∧〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
,
k = 0, 1, . . . , s− 1.
Proof. Assume α ∈M ∧Evl(f¯). By Lemma 14.2.3, for any n with Fnlk(n),
k = 0, 1, . . . , s, there is a set as+1 such that Fnterm(α, n, f¯ , a), and by Lemma
14.4.1:
∀m
[
Subfnlq(m,n) ⊃ ∀y
s
(
〈m, y〉 ∈ a ≡ 〈m, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯)
)]
, k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
(44)
1. Denote n = x0y. By (44), we have for any ys:
〈n, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ 〈n, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {0}s
by Lemma 14.3.1.
Part 2 is proven similarly. Parts 3, 5 and 6 are similar to part 4, which we will
consider next.
4. Denote n = xF ki y. By (44), we have for any y
s:
〈n, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ 〈n, y〉 ∈ a ≡ y = {V alk(fk, 3i)}
s−k
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by Lemma 14.3.4.
Parts 7-9 are similar to part 10, which we will consider next.
10. Denote n = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y. By (44):
∀ys
(
〈n, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ 〈n, y〉 ∈ a
)
;
∀ys
(
〈j, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ 〈j, y〉 ∈ a
)
;
∀ys
(
〈i, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ 〈i, y〉 ∈ a
)
.
By Lemma 14.3.10, for any ys:
〈n, y〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ≡ 〈n, y〉 ∈ a
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ a ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
≡ ∃wk+1, v0, uk
(
〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯)
∧〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w ∧ y = {u}s−k
)
.
⊣
Lemma 14.6. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1. Fnlk(n) ∧ 〈n, uk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ⊃ u ∈ ak.
2. 〈n, uk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈n, vk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ⊃ u = v.
3. α, β ∈M ∧ β  α ⊃ Fnt(α, f¯) ⊆ Fnt(β, f¯).
4. α ∈M ∧ Fnlk(n) ∧ Evl(f¯)∧ ”Ss+1 is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃uk[〈n, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯)].
Proof. 1. Proof is by induction on n. The cases of constants follow from
Lemma 14.5.1, 2. The cases of variables follow from Evl(f¯) and Lemma 14.5.3-6.
Assume the formula holds for numbers less than n. We will consider the only
non-trivial case n = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y. Suppose 〈n, uk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯). Then by
Lemma 14.5.10. there exist wk+1, v0 such that
〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w.
By the inductive assumption, w ∈ ak+1 and by the definition of ak+1, u ∈ ak.
2. Proof is by induction on n. The cases of constants and variables follow
from Lemma 14.5.1-6.
Assume the formula holds for numbers less than n. We will consider the only
non-trivial case n = xApk+1(Zj, Zi)y.
Suppose 〈n, uk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) and 〈n, vk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯). By Lemma 14.5.10,
there exist wk+11 , r
0
1 and w
k+1
2 , r
0
2 such that
〈j, w1〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈i, r1〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), r1〉, u〉 ∈ w1
∧ 〈j, w2〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈i, r2〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), r2〉, v〉 ∈ w2.
By the inductive assumption, w1 = w2 and r1 = r2, so 〈α¯(k + 1), r1〉, v〉 ∈ w1.
Since w1 is a function, we get u = v.
3. Assume the premises. It is sufficient to prove that for any n with Fnlk(n):
〈n, uk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ⊃ 〈n, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯), k = 0, 1, . . . , s.(45)
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We prove (45) by induction on n. The cases of constants and variables follow
from Lemma 14.5.1-6.
Assume (45) holds for numbers less than n. We consider the only non-trivial
case n = xApk+1(Zj , Zi)y. Suppose 〈n, uk〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯). By Lemma 14.5.10,
there exist wk+1 and v0 such that
〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(α, f¯) ∧ 〈〈α¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w.
By the inductive assumption, 〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) and 〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯). By
part 1, w ∈ ak+1 and is monotonic. Since β  α, we have:
β¯(k + 1) k α¯(k + 1) and 〈〈β¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w,
which implies 〈n, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯).
4. Proof is by induction on n. The cases of constants and variables follow
from Lemma 14.5.1-6 by taking β = α.
Assume the formula holds for numbers less than n. We will consider the only
non-trivial case n = xApk+1(Zj, Zi)y.
Suppose ”Ss+1 is a path in M through α”. By the inductive assumption
there exist β1, β2 ∈ S and wk+1, v0 such that 〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(β1, f¯) and 〈i, v〉 ∈
Fnt(β2, f¯). By part 1, w ∈ ak+1.
Denote S1 = {γ¯(k+1) | γ ∈ S}. Then S1 is a path in dk and by completeness
of w there exist c ∈ S1 and uk such that 〈〈c, v〉, u〉 ∈ w. There is γ ∈ S with
γ¯(k + 1) = c.
Denote β = min{γ, β1, β2}. Then
β  γ and β¯(k + 1) k γ¯(k + 1),
and by monotonicity of w, 〈〈β¯(k + 1), v〉, u〉 ∈ w.
By part 3, 〈j, w〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) and 〈i, v〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯). By Lemma 14.5.10, this
implies 〈n, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯). ⊣
We denote Frm(n) the arithmetic formula stating that n is the Go¨del number
of a formula of SLPs. We denote Subfrm(m,n) the arithmetic formula stating
that m is the Go¨del number of a sub-formula of the formula with Go¨del number
n. Next we introduce a predicate Forset(n, bs+1), which means that b is the set
of forcing values of all evaluated sub-formulas of ϕn at all nodes in M .
Forset(n, bs+1)⇌ Frm(n) ∧ (∀xs ∈ b)(∃α ∈M)∃m, f¯, δ
[
x = 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉
∧Subfrm(m,n) ∧Evl(f¯) ∧ (δ = 0 ∨ δ = 1)
]
∧ ∀m {Subfrm(m,n)
⊃ (∀α ∈M)∀f¯
[
Evl(f¯) ⊃ (〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
∧¬(〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b) ∧D(α,m, f¯ , b)
]}
,
where D(α,m, f¯ , b)⇌
13∨
r=1
Dr, and D1 −D13 are defined as follows.
D1 ⇌ m = x⊥y ∧ 〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b.
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D2 ⇌
s∨
k=0
∃i, j
{
m = xZi =k Zjy ∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃uk(〈i, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) ∧ 〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯))
]]}
.
D3 ⇌ ∃i, j {m = xϕi ∧ ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡
(
〈α, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
.
D4 ⇌ ∃i, j {m = xϕi ⊃ ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ (∀β ∈M)(β  α ∧ 〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ⊃ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
]}
.
D5 ⇌ ∃i, j
{
m = xϕi ∨ ϕjy ∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
≡ ∀Ss+1 (”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)
(
〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
))]}
.
D6 ⇌ ∃i, j {m = x∀xiϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀u0
(
〈α, j, Sub0(f¯ , i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
.
D7 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
{
m = x∀F ki ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ (∀uk ∈ ak)
(
〈α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
.
D8 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
{
m = x∀Aki ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ (∀uk ∈ bk)
(
〈α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
.
D9 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
{
m = x∀Fki ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ (∀uk ∈ lk)
(
〈α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
.
D10 ⇌ ∃i, j {m = x∃xiϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 (”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃u0
(
〈β, j, Sub0(f¯ , i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
))]}
.
D11 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
{
m = x∃F ki ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 (”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ ak)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
))]}
.
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D12 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
{
m = x∃Aki ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 (”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ bk)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u), 1〉 ∈ b
))]}
.
D13 ⇌
s∨
k=1
∃i, j
{
m = x∃Fki ϕjy
∧
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 (”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b
))]}
.
Denote
b |m= {〈α, j, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b | Subfrm(j,m)}.
Lemma 14.7. The following formulas are derived in TIs+1.
1. Subfrm(m,n) ∧ Forset(n, bs+1) ⊃ Forset(m, b |m).
2. Forset(n, bs+1) ∧ Forset(n, cs+1) ⊃ b = c.
3. Frm(n) ⊃ ∃!bs+1Forset(n, b).
Proof. 1. Assume the premises. For any j with Subfrm(j,m) we have:
(∀α ∈M)∀f¯
[
Evl(f¯ ⊃ D(α, j, f¯ , b))
]
(46)
and
∀β, f¯ , δ
[
〈β, j, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈β, j, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b |m
]
.(47)
To prove Forset(m, b |m), it is sufficient to show for any j:
Subfrm(j,m) ⊃ (∀α ∈M)∀f¯
[
Evl(f¯) ⊃ D(α, j, f¯ , b |m)
]
.(48)
When ϕj is an atomic formula or ⊥, (48) follows from (46).
Suppose j = x∃Fkr ϕpy. Consider α ∈M and f¯ with Evl(f¯). By (46),
〈α, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)
(
〈β, p, Subk(f¯ , 3r + 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]
and by (47):
〈α, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b |m≡ ∀S
s+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)
(
〈β, p, Subk(f¯ , 3r + 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b |m
)]
,
which implies D(α, j, f¯ , b |m).
In the cases of other quantifiers and logical connectives the proof is similar.
2. Assume the premises. It is sufficient to prove:
∀m
[
Subfrm(m,n) ⊃ (〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c)
]
.(49)
If (49) is proven, then for any α,m, f¯ we have:
〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ b ≡ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ c ≡ 〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ c,
and this implies b = c.
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We prove (49) by induction on m.
Case 1: m = x⊥y. Then 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ b and 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ c.
Case 2: m = xZi =k Zjy. Proof follows from the definition of D2.
Assume (49) holds for numbers less than m.
Case 3: m = x∃Fki ϕjy. By the inductive assumption:
∀β, f¯(〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c).
So for any α, f¯ :
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)(〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b)
]
≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)(〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ c)
]
≡ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c.
The cases of other quantifiers and logical connectives are similar.
3. The uniqueness was proven in part 2. We will prove the existence by
induction on n.
Case 1: n = x⊥y. We take bs+1 = {〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 | α ∈M ∧ Evl(f¯)}.
Case 2: n = xZi =k Zjy. Denote
ϕ(α, i, j, f¯ )⇌ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃uk(〈i, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) ∧ 〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯))
]
.
We take
bs+1 = {〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 | α ∈M ∧Evl(f¯) ∧ ϕ(α, i, j, f¯ )}
∪ {〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 | α ∈M ∧ Evl(f¯) ∧ ¬ϕ(α, i, j, f¯ )}.
Clearly Forset(n, b) holds.
Assume the existence for numbers less than n.
Case 3: n = xϕi ∨ϕjy. By the inductive assumption there exist sets cs+1 and
ds+1 such that Forset(i, c) and Forset(j, d). Denote
ψ(α, i, j, f¯)⇌ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c ∨ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ d)
]
.
We take
bs+1 = c ∪ d ∪ {〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 | α ∈M ∧ Evl(f¯) ∧ ψ(α, i, j, f¯)}
∪ {〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 | α ∈M ∧ Evl(f¯) ∧ ¬ψ(α, i, j, f¯ )}.
First we prove:
∀p
[
Subfrm(p, i) ⊃ ∀β, f¯ , δ
(
〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c
)]
.(50)
Assume the premises of (50). If ¬Subfrm(p, j), then the conclusion is obvious.
If Subfrm(p, j), then Forset(p, c |p) and Forset(p, d |p) by part 1, c |p= d |p by
part 2 and for any β, f¯ , δ:
〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c |p ∪d |p≡ 〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c.
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(50) is proven. Similarly,
∀p
[
Subfrm(p, j) ⊃ ∀β, f¯ , δ
(
〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈β, p, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ d
)]
.(51)
To prove Forset(n, b), it is sufficient to show:
(52) ∀m
{
Subfrm(m,n) ⊃ (∀α ∈M)∀f¯
[
Evl(f¯)
⊃ ¬(〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b) ∧D(α,m, f¯ , b)
]}
.
Assume Subfrm(m,n).
i) m = n.
Suppose α ∈ M and Evl(f¯). Then ¬(〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b) follows
from the definition of b.
Applying (50) to p = i and (51) to p = j, we get:
〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ψ(α, i, j, f¯) ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c ∨ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ d)
]
≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
]
,
which implies D(α, n, f¯ , b).
ii) m < n.
Then Subfrm(m, i) ∨ Subfrm(m, j). We can assume Subfrm(m, i) without
loss of generality. Due to Forset(i, c) we have ¬(〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ c∧〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ c)
and by (50),
¬(〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b).
D(α,m, f¯ , b) is also also derived from Forset(i, c) by applying (50) to each
possible form of the formula ϕm.
This completes the proof for case 3. The cases of other logical connectives and
quantifiers are similar. ⊣
Lemma 14.8. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
α ∈M ∧ Subfrm(m,n) ∧ Evl(f¯) ∧ Forset(n, bs+1)
implies each of the following formulas.
1. 〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b.
2. ¬(〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α,m, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b).
3. 〈α, x⊥y, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b.
4. m = xZi =k Zjy ⊃
{
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M
through α” ⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃uk(〈i, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) ∧ 〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯))
]}
,
k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
5. m = xϕi ∧ ϕjy
⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡
(
〈α, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∧ 〈α, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
)]
.
6. m = xϕi ⊃ ϕjy
⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ (∀β ∈M)(β  α ∧ 〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ⊃ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
]
.
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7. m = xϕi ∨ ϕjy ⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 (”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)
(
〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
))]
.
8. m = x∀xiϕjy ⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀u0
(
〈α, j, Sub0(f¯ , i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]
.
9. m = x∀F ki ϕjy ⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
≡ (∀uk ∈ ak)
(
〈α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
10. m = x∀Aki ϕjy ⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
≡ (∀uk ∈ bk)
(
〈α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
11. m = x∀Fki ϕjy ⊃
[
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
≡ (∀uk ∈ lk)
(
〈α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
12. m = x∃xiϕjy ⊃
{
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃u0
(
〈β, j, Sub0(f¯ , i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
.
13. m = x∃F ki ϕjy ⊃
{
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ ak)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
14. m = x∃Aki ϕjy ⊃
{
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ bk)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
15. m = x∃Fki ϕjy ⊃
{
〈α,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b
)]}
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Proof. Follows from the definition of Forset. ⊣
We define
Forces+1 =
{
xs | ∃n, bs+1(Forset(n, b) ∧ x ∈ b)
}
.
Thus, Force is the set of the forcing values of all evaluated formulas of SLPs at
all nodes of the Beth model Bs.
Lemma 14.9.
TIs+1 ⊢ Forset(n, b
s+1) ∧ Subfrm(m,n)
⊃
(
〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ Force
)
.
Proof. Assume the premises. Then Forset(m, b |m) by Lemma 14.7.1.
⇒ If 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b, then 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b |m and 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ Force by the
definition of the set Force.
⇐ Suppose 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ Force. Then there is cs+1 with Forset(m, c) and
〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ c. By Lemma 14.7.2, c = b |m, so 〈α,m, f¯ , δ〉 ∈ b |m⊆ b. ⊣
Finally we introduce the forcing predicate Fr:
Fr(α, n, f¯)⇌ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ Force.
Clearly, Fr depends on s but we will omit s for brevity.
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Lemma 14.10. It is derived in TIs+1 that the formula
α ∈M ∧Evl(f¯)
implies each of the following formulas.
1. Frm(n) ⊃
(
¬Fr(α, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ Force
)
.
2. Fr(α, x⊥y, f¯) ≡⊥.
3. Fr(α, xZi =k Zjy, f¯) ≡ ∀S
s+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃uk(〈i, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) ∧ 〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯))
]
, k = 0, 1, . . . , s.
4. Fr(α, xϕi ∧ ϕjy, f¯) ≡ Fr(α, i, f¯) ∧ Fr(α, j, f¯ ).
5. Fr(α, xϕi ⊃ ϕjy, f¯) ≡ (∀β ∈M)
[
β  α ∧ Fr(α, i, f¯ ) ⊃ Fr(α, j, f¯ )
]
.
6. Fr(α, xϕi ∨ ϕjy, f¯) ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)
(
Fr(β, i, f¯ ) ∨ Fr(β, j, f¯ )
)]
.
7. Fr(α, x∀xiϕjy, f¯) ≡ ∀u0Fr(α, j, Sub0(f¯ , i, u)).
8. Fr(α, x∀F ki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ (∀u
k ∈ ak)Fr(α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i, u)), k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
9. Fr(α, x∀Aki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ (∀u
k ∈ bk)Fr(α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u)), k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
10. Fr(α, x∀Fki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ (∀u
k ∈ lk)Fr(α, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i + 2, u)), k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
11. Fr(α, x∃xiϕjy, f¯) ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃u0Fr(β, j, Sub0(f¯ , i, u))
]
.
12. Fr(α, x∃F ki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ ∀S
s+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ ak)Fr(β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i, u))
]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
13. Fr(α, x∃Aki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ ∀S
s+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ bk)Fr(β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 1, u))
]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
14. Fr(α, x∃Fki ϕjy, f¯) ≡ ∀S
s+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)Fr(β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u))
]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Proof. Assume α ∈M ∧Evl(f¯). By Lemma 14.7.3, for any n with Frm(n)
there is a set bs+1 such that Forset(n, b) and by Lemma 14.9:
∀m
[
Subfrm(m,n) ⊃ ∀β, f¯(Fr(β,m, f¯ ) ≡ 〈β,m, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b)
]
.(53)
1. By (53) for any n with Frm(n):
¬Fr(α, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 /∈ b ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ b ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 0〉 ∈ Force
by Lemma 14.8.2, 1 and Lemma 14.9.
2. Denote n = x⊥y.
By (53) and Lemma 14.8.3, 2, Fr(α, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ⊥.
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3. Denote n = xZi =k Zjy. By (53) and Lemma 14.8.4,
Fr(α, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)∃uk(〈i, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯) ∧ 〈j, u〉 ∈ Fnt(β, f¯))
]
.
Parts 4 and 5 are similar to part 6, which we consider next.
6. Denote n = xϕi ∨ ϕjy. By (53):
∀β, f¯
[
Fr(β, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈β, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
,
∀β, f¯
[
Fr(β, i, f¯) ≡ 〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
,
∀β, f¯
[
Fr(β, j, f¯ ) ≡ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
.
By Lemma 14.8.7,
Fr(α, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)
(
〈β, i, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ∨ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]]
≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)
(
Fr(β, i, f¯) ∨ Fr(β, j, f¯ )
)]
.
Parts 7-13 are similar to part 14, which we consider next.
14. Denote n = x∃Fki ϕjy. By (53):
∀β, f¯
[
Fr(β, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈β, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
,
∀β, f¯
[
Fr(β, j, f¯ ) ≡ 〈β, j, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b
]
.
By Lemma 14.8.15,
Fr(α, n, f¯ ) ≡ 〈α, n, f¯ , 1〉 ∈ b ≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)
(
〈β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u), 1〉 ∈ b
]]
≡ ∀Ss+1 [”S is a path in M through α”
⊃ (∃β ∈ S)(∃uk ∈ lk)Fr(β, j, Subk(f¯ , 3i+ 2, u))
]
.
⊣
Theorem 14.3. TIs+1 ⊢ PrfSLPs(m) ∧ Evl(f¯) ⊃ Fr(ε,m, f¯), where ε was
defined in Definition 4.1.
Proof. Informal proofs in sections 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are easily formalised in
TIs+1, due to Lemmas 14.10, 14.5 and 14.6. ⊣
14.3. The strengths of theories SLPs and SLP .
Theorem 14.4. TIs+1 ⊢ Con(SLPs), s = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof. Suppose s > 1. If TIs+1 is inconsistent, then any formula can be
derived in it. We assume that it is consistent. We will describe derivation in
TIs+1 informally.
For any k = 1, 2, . . . , s we fix trivial elements in the domains ak, bk and lk:
g0k = g1k = Kˆ
k;
g2k = νk(ξ), where ξ =
{
〈〈n, yk〉, yk〉 | y ∈ ak−1
}
.
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Thus, g0k ∈ ak, g1k ∈ bk and g2k ∈ lk. Next we fix a trivial evaluation f¯ :
f10 = {〈i, 0〉 | i = i}; for k = 1, 2, . . . , s:
fkk =
{
〈3i, zk−1〉 | i ∈ ω ∧ z ∈ g0k
}
∪
{
〈3i+ 1, zk−1〉 | i ∈ ω ∧ z ∈ g1k
}
∪
{
〈3i+ 2, zk−1〉 | i ∈ ω ∧ z ∈ g2k
}
.
Then Evl(f¯).
Assume PrfSLPs(x⊥y). By Theorem 14.3, Fr(ε, x⊥y, f¯) that contradicts
Lemma 14.10.2. Therefore ¬PrfSLPs(x⊥y).
Now suppose s = 0. Clearly SLP0 is the intuitionistic first-order arithmetic
HA and TI1 is the classical second-order arithmetic, the same as T1. The theo-
rem follows from the well-known fact that T1 ⊢ Con(HA). ⊣
Theorem 14.5. For s = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
1. SLPs+1 ⊢ Con(TIs);
2. SLPs+1 ⊢ Con(SLPs) .
Proof. 1. By Theorem 13.2, we have TIs+1 ⊢ Con(TIs). By Theorem 12.1.1,
we have SLPs+1 ⊢ int(Con(TIs)). By Lemma 12.3, SLPs+1 ⊢ Con(TIs), since
Con(TIs) ≡ ∀n¬ProofTIs (n, x⊥y) and ProofTIs(n, x⊥y) defines a primitive
recursive predicate.
2. By Theorem 14.4, we have TIs+1 ⊢ Con(SLPs). By Theorem 12.1.1,
SLPs+1 ⊢ int(Con(SLPs)) and by Lemma 12.3, SLPs+1 ⊢ Con(SLPs). ⊣
Theorem 14.6. 1. SLP2 ⊢ Con(In) for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
2. SLP3 ⊢ Con(I).
3. SLP ⊢ Con(I).
Proof. 1. By Theorem 13.3, we have TI2 ⊢ Con(In). By Theorem 12.1.1,
SLP2 ⊢ int(Con(In)) and by Lemma 12.3, SLP2 ⊢ Con(In).
2. By Theorem 13.4.1,TI3 ⊢ Con(I). By Theorem 12.1.1, SLP3 ⊢ int(Con(I))
and SLP3 ⊢ Con(I) by Lemma 12.3.
Part 3 follows from part 2. ⊣
The theory SLP is clearly weaker than the fully impredicative theory T but it
has the same strength as the quite impredicative theory TI and is stronger than
the more predicative theory I. In particular, SLP is stronger than the second
order arithmetic.
§15. Discussion. In this paper we constructed a Beth model Bs for the lan-
guage of intuitionistic functionals of types 1, 2, . . . , s. We combined the intu-
itionistic principles that hold in the models Bs(s > 1) into a relatively strong
intuitionistic theory SLP . The theory SLP contains axioms for lawless function-
als of high types, some versions of choice axioms and the theory of the ”creating
subject”.
We did not manage to construct one Beth model for the entire theory SLP ;
combining all the models Bs in one does not work because their cardinalities
increase indefinitely with the increase of s. However, the models Bs(s > 1) are
sufficient, since any proof in SLP is finite and contains only a finite number of
types.
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We compared SLP with a classical typed set theory TI that has a restricted
but impredicative comprehension axiom. By formalising the Beth model Bs
in the language TI, we showed the equiconsistency of each fragment TIs with
the corresponding fragment SLPs and also the equiconsistency of TI and SLP .
Thus, SLP is stronger than any fragment TIs and in particular, it is stronger
than the second order arithmetic.
We interpreted the classical theory TI in our intuitionistic theory SLP . Many
parts of classical mathematics can be developed in TI and therefore justified from
the intuitionistic point of view, due to this interpretation.
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